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A PEER READ PUBLICATION
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe
IN MEMORIAL
On July 6, 2009 31-year old Ontario 
Provincial Police Probationary Constable 
Alan Hack was killed in an automobile 
accident in West Elgin, Ontario.
Constable Hack and his partner were pursuing  a 
suspected car thief when their patrol car collided with 
an asphalt truck at 1:20 pm, causing  both constables to 
be thrown from their cruiser. Constable Hack was 
transported to hospital where he died. His partner, who 
was driving, sustained serious, but non-life threatening 
injuries and survived.
Constable Hack had served with the 
Ontario Provincial Police for only 
six months and was assigned to the 
Dutton satel l i te of the Elgin 
detachment. He had previously 
served as a cadet with the agency 
for two years and as an auxiliary officer with the 
London Police Service for two years. Constable Hack is 
survived by his fiancée.
SUPREME WARNING
“We expect police to adhere to higher standards than alleged criminals.” - 
Supreme Court of Canada R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 at para. 41.
Read about this case and many more Supreme Court judgments in this issue of 
“In Service: 10-8”. Past issues available online at www.jibc.ca.
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Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
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Highlights In This Issue
Evidence Admitted Despite Intentional Breach 4
Search Incidental To Arrest Requires Proper 
Purpose
8
Fake Gun Test Not A Charter Breach 10
s.10(b) Imposes Duties On Both The Police & The 
Detainee
13
Grounds Objectively Justified: No ss.8 or 9 
Breaches Made Out
20
Prima Facie Case For Breath Demand No Needed: 
RPG Sufficient
20
Despite Unlawful Detention, Gun Admitted 22
Stop & Search A Blatant Disregard For Charter 
Rights: Evidence Excluded
30
Investigative Detention Triggers s.10(b) Right to 
Counsel
36
No Privacy In Garbage Put Out For Collection 42
Police Duty To Disclose Can Include Disciplinary 
Files
48
Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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British Columbia 
Police and Peace Officers 
Memorial Service
Sunday
September 27, 2009
Form up  11:40 am
March off 12:00 pm
Ceremony 1:00 pm
HMCS Discovery
Brockton Oval
Stanley Park
Vancouver, 
British Columbia
More info at 
www.memorialribbon.com
Dr. Kim Rossmo - current research & latest book
“Criminal Investigative Failures”
Presented by Simon Fraser University - Police Studies Program
Friday October 16, 2009 from 12:45 pm to 2:20 pm @ SFU, Burnaby, B.C.
Registration for October 16th contact Ms. Dena Coburn at dcoburn@sfu.ca 
Presented by Justice Institute of British Columbia - Police Academy Advanced Training
Monday October 19, 2009 from 10:30 am onwards @ JIBC, New Westminster, B.C.
Registration for October 19th contact Ms. Karen Albrecht at kalbrecht@jibc.ca 
There is no cost for police personnel attending either of these presentations.
Free Training
CF MILITARY POLICE 
CROSS COUNTRY RELAY
The CF Military Police are hosting  a 
cross county motorcycle relay ride in 
support of two charities. On Sept. 2 
Military and civilian police officers 
will finish the last leg  of their first-
ever Military Police National 
Motorcycle Relay Ride (MPNMRR) 
by riding  from Victoria to 19 Wing 
Comox.
The MPNMRR began in St. John’s 
NFLD on August 15 and will finish at Air Force Beach 
at 19 Wing  Comox. The 7,392 km relay is a 
fundraiser for the Military Police Fund for Blind 
Children and the Support Our Troops Campaign. A 
stuffed Military Police Bear has been chosen to ride 
along  for the entire journey and will also be used as 
the official baton.
The ride is open to all serving  and retired military and 
civilian police, military and any other affiliates such 
as the Blue Knights, Corrections and Customs. The 
B.C. leg  will begin in Jasper on Aug  30 and more 
riders are still needed. The cost to participate is $50, 
which goes directly to the two charities.
For more information on the relay or to register visit:  
www.mpnmrr.ca
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EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
DESPITE INTENTIONAL 
BREACH
R. v. Styles, 2009 ABCA 98 
The accused was involved in a verbal 
argument with his brother about 4:30 
pm which lead to an altercation. He 
produced and pointed a pen gun and 
made gestures to fire it. Fortunately, the 
gun did not work and the accused fled in a vehicle, 
pursued by his brother who called 911. Police 
located and arrested the accused in the area and he 
was advised of his Charter rights 
and was given a caution in an 
abbreviated form from the 
officer’s memory. The accused 
said he wished to contact 
counsel and that he did not wish 
to say anything  when told that 
he did not have to. He was then 
handcuffed and put into the 
back of a police car. The police 
surveyed the area because the 
accused asserted that he did not 
know where the gun was. There 
were two junior high schools 
and an elementary school 
nearby and officers searched for 
the pen gun for 15 minutes. A 
police tracking  dog  was called to the scene. When 
the arresting  officer asked the accused where the pen 
gun was, he said it was well hidden but offered to tell 
them where it was if he would be let go. The officer 
replied that if the accused told him where the pen 
gun was he would have “a deal.” The accused called 
the officer a liar, but the officer again asked where the 
gun was and said, “You have a deal.” The accused 
escorted the officers to where the pen gun was 
located. It and a .22 calibre cartridge were located. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the Crown 
conceded that the accused’s s.10(b) Charter rights 
were violated but did not seek admission of any 
statements made by the accused before he was given 
a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. 
However, the Crown sought the admission of the pen 
gun as evidence. The accused testified that the police 
obtained the gun after having  handcuffed him 
uncomfortably for an hour and after a somewhat 
rough arrest. It was only when the officer started 
talking  about the safety of children that he broke 
down and revealed the gun’s location. Although the 
trial judge did not find this situation to be one of 
“urgent and dangerous circumstances” nor a situation 
of lack of due diligence which might suspend the 
police duty to refrain from seeking  self-incriminatory 
evidence from the accused, the trial judge concluded 
that, having  regard to the anticipated presence of 
children in the area, it would have been bad practice 
not to do what the police did, i.e. to acquire the pen 
gun by questioning  the accused. After finding  that the 
police were acting  in good 
faith, the trial judge admitted 
the pen gun into evidence 
under s.24(2). The accused was 
convicted of uttering  threats, 
u s i n g  a f i r e a r m w h i l e 
committing  an offence, pointing 
a firearm, and having  a weapon 
in his possession for a purpose 
dangerous to the public peace. 
The accused appealed to the 
A lbe r t a Cour t o f Appea l 
arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge ought to have excluded 
the pen gun from evidence in 
light of the circumstances under which it was 
recovered. But, after assessing  the trial judge’s 
application of the s.24(2) analysis involving  the 
factors of trial fairness, the seriousness of the 
violation, and the admission of the evidence on the 
repute of justice, the Appeal Court upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling. 
Trial Fairness
The pen gun itself was non-conscriptive evidence, but 
the manner in which the police located it involved 
conscriptive action thereby making  it derivative 
evidence. The impact on trial fairness, however, 
could be largely reduced, if not eliminated, if the 
Crown could demonstrate, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the evidence would have been 
“Although this was probably an 
intentional Charter breach to 
acquire the pen gun, the sincere 
and imminent public safety 
concerns held by the police help 
determine the magnitude of 
infringement,” said the Appeal 
Court. “The urgency of a situation 
is ... not one readily amenable to ‘a 
protracted pedagogical review’.”
Volume 9 Issue 4 - July/August 2009
PAGE 5
obtained by alternative means, such as by an 
independent source or by inevitable discovery. In this 
case, the police had two strong  motives to find the 
pen gun - the safety of children nearby and the 
forensic value of the evidence if promptly recovered. 
The area to search was not particularly large and a 
tracking  dog  had arrived. The victim saw where the 
accused ran and the police would have inevitably 
found the pen gun even though their efforts to find it 
so far had been unavailing.
Seriousness (Magnitude) of the Violation
The police acted in good faith and the priority given 
to f ind ing  the gun was 
reasonable. “Although this was 
p robab ly an in ten t iona l 
Charter breach to acquire the 
pen gun, the sincere and 
i m m i n e n t p u b l i c s a f e t y 
concerns held by the police 
help determine the magnitude 
of infringement,” said the 
Appeal Court. “The urgency of 
a situation is ... not one readily 
amenable to ‘a protracted 
pedagogical review’.” The Court continued:
Moreover, magnitude of infringement is not 
defined simply by reference to the Charter sub-
section in which it arises.
“
What is said to be the “magnitude” here is not the 
fact of acquiring forensically significant self-
incriminatory evidence but only a physical 
object. The Crown did not need - and the trial 
judge did not link - the evidence of the 
[ accused ’s ] s t a t emen t s , i nc lud ing t he 
whereabouts of the gun, to identify the object as 
a gun as the physical object was shown to [the 
victim]. This is not a case of multiple Charter 
breaches or police misconduct directed towards 
the [accused]. [references omitted, paras. 15-16]
The circumstances of the accused’s arrest and 
detention was unrelated to the breach. Although he 
asserted that being  handcuffed in the car discomfited 
him, he said he told the police where the gun was 
because the police appealed to his conscience. The 
trial judge had also found the accused had suffered 
no significant prejudice by admitting  the gun, 
perhaps because the accused’s rights had not been 
ser iously abused or because the forensic 
consequence of admission of the pen gun, having 
regard to the victim’s evidence describing  it, was of a 
reduced forensic impact. 
Effect of Exclusion on Repute of Justice
In holding  the pen gun admissible as evidence the 
Court concluded:
In a case involving  a missing firearm in an area 
where children play, the impression of a 
reasonable observer, aware of the 
facts and having thought the matter 
t h r o u g h , w o u l d h a r d l y b e 
irrelevant. Even in the United 
States, with its robust exclusionary 
rule focussed on deterrence of 
police misconduct, it is recognized 
that indiscriminate application of 
the exclusionary rule may well 
“generate disrespect for the law 
and administration of justice”. 
Misuse of firearms has become a 
plague in Alberta cities even more 
than in many other parts of Canada. The 
exclusion of this evidence would do more harm 
to the repute of justice than its admission. In the 
result, we do not find error by the trial judge in 
his conclusion under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
[references omitted, para. 18]
And if the pen gun was excluded, there was other 
evidence which could support it being  a firearm, 
such as spontaneous admissions made by the 
accused during  the trial as well as testimony from the 
victim. So even if admission was an error, the trial 
judge’s finding  that the accused used a pen gun 
(firearm) did not occasion a substantial wrong  or 
miscarriage of justice. Since the pen gun was 
properly admitted, the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“Misuse of firearms has become 
a plague in Alberta cities even 
more than in many other parts of 
Canada. The exclusion of this 
evidence would do more harm to 
the repute of justice than its 
admission..”
www.10-8.ca
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DOCTRINE OF ‘TRANSFERRED 
INTENT’ DOES NOT APPLY TO 
ATTEMPT MURDER
R. v. Gordon, 2009 ONCA 170
The accused was involved in an 
altercation and retaliation incident 
with innocent victims following  an 
abortive drug  purchase outside a Cafe. 
The accused had offered to buy an 
ounce of marihuana for $90, but the prospective drug 
dealer was angered by the low ball offer and 
punched the accused and one of his friends. The 
accused and his friends scattered. A few minutes later 
the accused returned with a sawed off shotgun, firing 
three blasts in the direction of 
the drug  dealer and others still 
standing  in front of the Cafe. 
When the shooting  began, the 
drug  dealer ran into the bar, 
through the premises and out 
the back door without being 
struck by any of the pellets. 
Others, however, were not so 
fortunate. 
Two women standing  on the 
sidewalk outside talking  when 
the shooting  began were struck 
by several shotgun pellets. One 
was hit in the ear, head and 
face, chest and arm, and on her hand while the other 
was hit in the face and neck, chest and right shoulder, 
arm, hand and wrist. A man, standing  and talking  on 
his cell phone, was also struck. He lost the sight in 
one eye and most of his sight in the other eye. The 
accused was charged with three counts of attempted 
murder and three counts of aggravated assault 
respecting  the victims struck by shotgun pellets and 
attempted murder, discharging  a firearm with intent 
and pointing a firearm in relation to the drug dealer.
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
Crown contended that the accused was guilty of 
attempted murder on the drug  dealer because he had 
an intention to kill him, and on each of the other 
injured victims through the common law doctrine of 
“transferred intent.” Because he intended to kill the 
drug  dealer, the mens rea of attempted murder was 
transferred to the other victims and founded his 
liability. The accused, on the other hand, submitted 
there was no evidence he intended to kill any injured 
victim, either as an individual or a member of a 
group of persons standing  outside the Cafe. In his 
view, the principles of transferred intent could not 
found liability for attempted murder. The trial judge 
concluded liability for attempted murder against the 
injured victims could be established through the 
application of transferred intent. The accused was 
convicted by a jury of all counts. After invoking  the 
Kienapple principle, the trial judge entered 
conditional stays on all counts except the four counts 
of attempted murder and sentenced the accused to 
10 years in prison.
The accused then appealed to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing  the trial judge was 
wrong  to instruct the jury that 
the doctrine of transferred 
intent was available to find 
liability for attempted murder 
on the injured victims. The 
unanimous Appeal Court 
agreed. Although a person 
who intends to kill another 
person, but by accident or 
mistake, kills someone else is 
guilty of murder, the person 
who intends to kill another, 
but by accident or mistake, 
hurts or injures someone else is not guilty of 
attempted murder. Justice Watt described the doctrine 
of transferred intent as follows:
The doctrine of transferred intent, sometimes 
described as transferred malice or transferred 
fault, applies when an injury intended for one 
falls on another by accident. When an accused, 
with the mens rea of a crime, does an act that 
causes the actus reus of the same crime, the 
doctrine holds that the accused commits the 
crime. The doctrine applies only where the harm 
that follows is of the same legal kind as that 
intended. Said differently, malice is transferred 
only within the limits of the same crime. Any 
defence, justification or excuse available to an 
“The doctrine of transferred intent, 
sometimes described as transferred 
malice or transferred fault, applies 
when an injury intended for one falls 
on another by accident. When an 
accused, with the mens rea of a 
crime, does an act that causes the 
actus reus of the same crime, the 
doctrine holds that the accused 
commits the crime.”
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accused in relation to the intended victim is 
likewise transferred to the actual victim.
The doctrine of transferred intent is said to be of 
general application (within the limits of the same 
crime), but it usually arises in the context of 
offences against the person, especially those 
offences that include consequences as part of 
their actus reus. [references omitted, paras. 
42-43]
And further:
The common law doctrine of transferred intent 
takes the mens rea of an offence in relation to an 
intended victim and transfers it to the actus reus 
of the same offence committed upon another 
victim. Considered separately, each prospective 
crime lacks an essential part. The mens rea 
(intended victim) lacks an actus reus. And the 
actus reus (actual victim) lacks mens rea. In 
combination, however, they amount to a whole 
crime through the application of a legal fiction. 
[para. 68]
But in deciding  that the doctrine of transferred intent 
did not apply to attempted murder, Justice Watt 
wrote:
In my view, a close examination of the principles 
that underlie the doctrine of transferred intent 
compels the conclusion that this common law 
doctrine does not apply to the inchoate crime of 
attempt, in particular to attempted murder, and 
thus cannot be part of our law through the 
operation of s. 8(2) of the 
Criminal Code [the criminal 
common law of England 
cont inues to apply in 
Canadian proceedings].
........
First, every crime, inchoate 
or substantive, involves both 
mens rea and an actus reus. 
The actus reus of many but 
not all crimes may include 
an element of harm, as for 
example the crimes of 
unlawful homicide. In most 
cases, including  offences 
against the person, the mens 
rea and actus reus relate to 
the same victim. When 
transferred intent principles are in play, however, 
the mens rea relates to an intended victim and 
the actus reus relates to the actual victim. The 
principles connect a culpable mental state in 
relation to one with a result or harm visited upon 
another.
The principles underlying transferred intent apply 
to crimes that require a result as part of the actus 
reus, for example, death of a human being in 
cases of unlawful homicide. But inchoate crimes 
in general, and attempted murder in particular, 
do not require a result or harm as part of their 
actus reus. The actus reus is complete upon the 
first act beyond preparation. 
Second, no modern and reasoned authority is 
offered to support the claim that transferred 
intent principles apply to the crime of attempted 
murder. 
In this case, if the [accused] intended to kill [the 
drug dealer] and, by accident or mistake, killed 
one or more bystanders, the unlawful homicide 
would be murder under s. 229(b). But it by no 
means follows that the [accused’s] crime is 
attempted murder where the bystanders were 
injured but not killed, although it would be 
murder if they died. 
Third, the application of transferred intent 
principles to the crime of attempted murder may 
extend liability unduly and foster irrational 
distinctions. X shoots at Y intending to kill him. 
In the vicinity of Y are several others. All hear the 
shot, but none are injured. How far do we 
extend the scope of liability 
on the basis of transferred 
intent?† If someone is injured, 
a bystander, is X guilty of 
attempted murder of that 
person on the basis of 
transferred intent? And, if so, 
are we making  a distinction 
o n t h e b a s i s o f a 
c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t i s 
immaterial to liability for 
attempted murder - injury or 
harm? Recourse to a legal 
fiction in these circumstances 
is scarcely necessary to fairly 
label and punish the crimes 
committed.
“In this case, if the [accused] 
intended to kill [the drug dealer] 
and, by accident or mistake, killed 
one or more bystanders, the unlawful 
homicide would be murder under 
s. 229(b). But it by no means follows 
that the [accused’s] crime is 
attempted murder where the 
bystanders were injured but not 
killed, although it would be murder if 
they died.” 
7
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Fourth, in crimes of attempt, it is not necessary to 
make a whole crime out of two halves by joining 
the intent in relation to one victim with the harm 
caused to another, the purpose that underlies the 
principle. When the unintended victim suffers no 
harm, the accused has already committed an 
inchoate crime in relation to the intended victim, 
a crime of the same level of gravity as if the 
intent were to be transferred under the doctrine. 
Leaving aside principles of concurrent intent, the 
accused may also be punished in connection 
with the unintended victim according to his 
moral culpability and the injury he or she has 
caused.
Finally, consummated criminal homicides are, in 
the last analysis, sui generis. Many of their 
complexities, of which the transferred intent 
doctrine (or its statutory surrogate) is one, simply 
do not travel well to other climes, especially 
those where harm is not a constituent of the 
actus reus. Moreover, no necessity exists forcing 
the transferred intent doctrine to march into 
territory other than that of actual, consummated 
criminal homicides. For the remainder, the 
actuality of the real mens rea, together with its 
precisely related actus reus, is enough to 
establish guilt at the appropriate level without 
any need to resort to an intention - shifting  legal 
fiction. [references omitted, paras. 69-77]
As a result, the Ontario Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge erred in law instructing  the jury on the 
application of transferred intent to charges of 
attempted murder on the three injured bystanders. 
The convictions of attempted murder for each of the 
three injured victims were set aside and convictions 
of aggravated assault were entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: An appeal of this case to the Supreme 
Court of Canada was dismissed.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO ARREST 
REQUIRES PROPER PURPOSE
R. v. Majedi, 2009 BCCA 276
The police stopped the accused after 
a computer check indicated she was 
breaching  her recognizance by being 
in the area. She told officers the 
provision was no longer in effect but 
did not have her court papers with her. A call to her 
"lawyer" confirmed this, but the officers weren't sure 
the person they spoke to was a lawyer. A police 
dispatcher confirmed the provision remained in force 
and the accused was arrested, handcuffed and 
secured in a police vehicle. 
The officers decided to impound the accused’s 
vehicle because it was illegally parked. A search 
turned up a woman's handbag  and a backpack. One 
officer searched the handbag, testifying  he did so to 
look for court papers and to inventory possible 
valuables. He found some money. The other officer 
searched the backpack to inventory it and protect 
police from potential liability if valuables went 
missing, and to search for sharp objects to protect 
custodial staff. Drug  paraphernalia and cash were 
found in the backpack and the accused was re-
arrested for drug  trafficking. Further searches of the 
car yielded more evidence to support the drug 
charge, but it was subsequently determined that the 
recognizance condition was no longer valid.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
accused challenged her arrest and the admissibility of 
the evidence the officers found. She submitted her 
rights under s.8 of the Charter had been breached 
and that the evidence should have been excluded 
under s.24(2), but the trial judge rejected her 
arguments. He found the arrest was valid and the 
searches that followed were lawful as an incident to 
the arrest. The searches were not simply for one 
purpose - to inventory the purse contents, he ruled. 
One purpose was to inventory valuables but the 
officers were also concerned about safety - there may 
have been a sharp item (needle or knife) or other 
weapon. The second purse was also searched to find 
court documents, which may have assisted the 
accused. Even if the searches breached her rights, the 
Note-able Quote
“Personal responsibility is a difficult thing to 
ask for in a nation which has attempted to find 
a societal ‘root cause” for all things.” - 
Shapley R. Hunter
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judge would have admitted the evidence under 
s.24(2). 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal, contending  the searches were for 
inventory only, not a valid criminal justice purpose, 
and therefore did not fall within the scope of a proper 
search incident to arrest. Thus, the searches were 
unreasonable under s.8  and the evidence should 
have been excluded under s.24(2), she submitted. The 
Crown countered that the searches were valid as an 
incident to arrest and, even if they were not, an 
inventory search was permissible when the vehicle 
was impounded. 
Although warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable, a search incident to arrest can justify 
them. Justice Chiasson, writing  the unanimous 
opinion, examined the power to search as an incident 
to arrest, noting a number of propositions: 
• Officers undertaking  a search incidental to arrest do 
not require reasonable and probable grounds; a 
lawful arrest provides that foundation and the right to 
search derives from it;
• The right to search does not arise out of a reduced 
expectation of privacy of the arrested person, but 
flows out of the need for authorities to gain control 
of the situation and to obtain information;
• A legally unauthorized search to make an inventory 
is not a valid search incidental to arrest;
• The three main purposes of a search incidental to 
arrest are: one, to ensure the safety of police and the 
public; two, to protect evidence; three, to discover 
evidence; 
• The categories of legitimate purposes are not closed: 
while the police have considerable leeway, a valid 
purpose is required that must be "truly incidental" to 
the arrest;
• If the justification for the search is to find evidence, 
there must be a reasonable prospect the evidence 
will relate to the offence for which the person has 
been arrested;
• Police undertaking  a search incidental to arrest 
subjectively must have a valid purpose in mind, the 
reasonableness of which must be considered 
objectively. 
In this case, Justice Chiasson found there was no 
issue of officer safety apparent to justify entering  the 
car; the accused was handcuffed and in a police 
vehicle. However, because the vehicle was to be 
impounded as an incidence of the arrest, the officer 
was entitled to enter it to determine whether there 
were dangerous items or weapons inside. 
The search of the purses, however, had nothing  to do 
with the crime for which the accused was arrested - 
breach of recognizance. "The facts needed to charge 
her for that crime were known: she was identified as 
a person in a place she wasn't supposed to be," said 
Justice Chiasson. The officer testified he was looking 
for exculpatory papers, a valid purpose that was 
connected to the arrest. The accused stated the 
papers were not there and the trial judge was entitled 
to accept the officer's stated purpose as an additional 
factor relevant to the validity of the search. 
Furthermore, both officers said they searched the 
purses, which would accompany the arrestee to the 
police station, for the safety of the jail staff. The 
officers reasonably believed the purses would likely 
accompany the accused to the jail, a belief that was 
objectively reasonable. On this point, Justice 
Chiasson stated:
The officers relied on their experience that 
personal effects such as purses usually 
accompany arrested persons to jail. They also 
relied on their experience and jail staff practise 
that requires an inventory of the contents of 
personal effects that are held by the police for 
safe keeping. In my view, the officers believed the 
purses would accompany [the accused] to the 
police station and would be searched there by jail 
staff. The subjective and objective requirements 
for searching the purses for objects that might 
imperil the safety of jail staff were met. [para. 32]
The court did caution that "the law is very clear that 
the police cannot simply rummage through the 
personal effects of arrested persons in the absence of 
a proper criminal justice purpose." 
Since the searches in this case were justified as an 
incident to arrest, it was unnecessary to determine 
whether they would have been valid solely for 
inventory purposes. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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FAKE GUM TEST NOT A CHARTER 
BREACH
R. v. Delaa, 2009 ABCA 179
The accused was a strong  suspect in 
two violent sexual assaults. An 
undercover operation was launched to 
obtain his DNA by collecting  cast off 
evidence. He was selling  his truck so 
undercover officers posed as potential purchasers. 
During  a test drive, an officer and the accused 
stopped at a gas station to check the vehicle's fluids. 
Another officer approached and asked if they would 
like to participate in a gum survey. Prior to the gum 
testing, the undercover taste tester offered the 
accused a lollipop which had been in her mouth. The 
accused placed it in his mouth, then returned it to 
her. The accused agreed to participate and sampled 
four pieces of gum, spitting  them into a Dixie cup 
provided by the undercover gum tester, ostensibly to 
avoid littering. DNA obtained from the gum and 
lollipop matched that of the sexual assault suspect. 
The accused was arrested and a warrant for his blood 
samples was obtained. Lab testing  confirmed the 
sample was a match.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench the 
judge concluded police did not breach the accused’s 
Charter rights during  the undercover operation. He 
did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy since he 
voluntarily participated in the 
gum survey, which occurred in a 
public place. He wasn't in police 
custody or control and discarded 
the gum as garbage. 
Even if there was a Charter 
breach, the judge would not 
have excluded the evidence 
under s.24(2). The DNA evidence 
was non-conscr ip t ive and 
discoverable in any event. The 
accused was not compelled, 
th rea tened o r coe rced to 
produce the evidence but 
participated willingly. Police 
acted in good faith, there was no 
interference with bodily integrity and the samples 
were willingly discarded or abandoned. 
Furthermore, the accused wasn't physically detained 
in any way, police dealt with him in an undercover 
capacity in a public place and he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the samples. As well, the 
trick was passive and not unfair or dirty. It would not 
shock the community and police ultimately obtained 
a sample of the accused’s DNA through a warrant. 
Any breach would not have been serious, the 
accused wasn't vulnerable and the operation was 
carried out in a respectful manner under 
circumstances of some urgency and necessity. The 
charges were serious, the DNA evidence crucial to 
the Crown's case and excluding  it would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The accused 
was convicted of two sexual assaults. 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal, 
arguing  the trial judge erred in finding  that there was 
no s.8  Charter violation when police seized his DNA. 
An illegal search occurred, he submitted, when the 
officer asked him to spit his chewing  gum into the 
cup. In the accused’s view, he did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the seized gum because he 
did not abandon it - the undercover officer collected 
it. And if his rights were breached, the accused also 
asserted the trial judge erred in his s.24(2) analysis.
When a person abandons property, 
they no longer have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it. In this 
case, the accused conceded that if he 
had merely dropped the gum onto 
the ground or put it in a garbage can, 
there would have been no violation 
of s.8. However, he submitted that 
the officer holding  out the cup - 
suggesting  where it should be put 
when he was finished with it - was 
state intervention or compulsion and 
therefore not abandonment. The 
appeal court disagreed. 
“Abandonment is a conclusion 
inferred from the conduct of the 
person claiming  the s.8 right, thus 
consideration of reasonableness (of a 
“Abandonment is a conclusion 
inferred from the conduct of 
the person claiming the s.8 
right, thus consideration of 
reasonableness (of a claimed 
expectation of privacy) must 
relate to the conduct of that 
person and not to anything 
done or not done by the 
police or anyone else involved 
in the subsequent collection 
and treatment of the items 
discarded.” 
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claimed expectation of privacy) must relate to the 
conduct of that person and not to anything  done or 
not done by the police or anyone else involved in the 
subsequent collection and treatment of the items 
discarded,” noted the court. “Thus, the focus must be 
on the conduct of the (accused) and whether a 
reasonable and objective person, considering  the 
totality of the circumstances, would think spitting  out 
the gum into the cup was abandonment.”
Spitting  out the gum in this case was abandonment, 
and it didn't matter whether the accused spit it into 
an anonymous object like a garbage can, the ground, 
an ashtray or in a receptacle someone placed in front 
of him - the cup. “It is the act of spitting  it out that 
evidenced what can only be seen as an unequivocal 
intention to dispose of it,” the Court said. “He was 
clearly finished with it and had no intention of 
preserving it.” 
As for the argument that the accused was compelled 
by state intervention to abandon the gum, the Court 
stated:
The act of the officer holding out the Dixie cup 
did not cause the (accused) to discard the gum; it 
merely provided an opportunity for the police to 
collect it. The actions of the (accused) were 
voluntary. He was free to choose to participate in 
the gum survey, free to choose whether to discard 
the gum and where to dispose of it. He wasn't 
compelled to put his gum into the cup, although 
it was suggested that he do so. (The accused) 
voluntarily discarded the gum as garbage, in a 
public setting and not in custody. The (accused) 
abandoned his privacy interest. [para. 20]
Finally, the police technique of providing  the cup 
wasn't intrusive nor objectively unreasonable. The 
undercover operation was merely a “passive trick” 
and could not be seen as a “dirty” one or as 
something  that would "shock the community".   There 
was no s.8 violation and therefore no need to 
consider s.24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
CONDOMINIUM MANAGEMENT 
NOT ACTING AS STATE AGENTS
R. v. Drakes & Brewster, 2009 ONCA 560
The two accused were involved in a 
sophisticated large scale fraud 
scheme concerning  the advance 
payment of fees in order to secure 
the release of huge multi-million 
dollar sums from the Central Bank of Nigeria.  The 
fees were collected from the victims who received 
nothing  in return. The scheme was operated out of a 
“boiler room” in a condominium unit. While the 
investigation was ongoing  there was a flood in the 
unit. As a result, maintenance staff made observations 
in the course of responding  to the flood and it was 
clear that the occupants of the unit were using  it as 
an office from which financial transactions were 
be ing  conduc ted . The ma in tenance s t a f f 
communicated this information to the condominium 
management, who called the police. The police took 
statements from the maintenance staff and obtained a 
warrant to search the condominium, recovering 
thousands of documents, at least ten telephones, and 
several fax machines which deeply implicated the 
accuseds in the fraud scheme. They were charged 
with several counts of fraud over $5,000, attempted 
fraud, and laundering the proceeds of crime. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge ruled that the search of the condominium was 
reasonable and did not violate s.8  of the Charter. She 
concluded, among  other findings, that s.8  of the 
Charter was not engaged when the police obtained 
information from the building  staff about the contents 
of the condominium when they responded to the 
flood. In her view, condominium and management 
staff had an obligation to respond to the flood and 
their entry had nothing  to do with police 
intervention. “It follows that the way in which the 
police had access to the information about certain 
items inside the unit was as a result of a normal 
response to the flood,” said the trial judge. 
“Management then contacted the police, not as 
agents but as citizens reporting  suspicious activity.” 
And even if the search was unreasonable, the 
evidence was admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. 
Drakes was convicted of seven counts and sentenced 
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to five years imprisonment while Brewster was 
convicted of five counts and sentenced to four years 
imprisonment.
The accuseds appealed their convictions to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
Charter was engaged when police “seized” 
information from the property managers.  But the 
Cour t o f Appeal d i sagreed. The bui ld ing 
superintendents and/or the property managers who 
provided the information about the contents of the 
condominium to the police were not “agents” of the 
state. The superintendents merely responded to a 
flood and then reported suspicious activity in the unit 
to the property managers who in turn furnished it to 
the police. Their conduct did not engage s.8  of the 
Charter because there was no state action: 
We note that before the building superintendents 
entered the condominium unit in response to the 
flood, they did not know that the police were 
conducting an investigation or had any interest in 
unit 216.  They received no special instructions 
from building management with respect to their 
inspection of the unit, nor were they directed to 
deal with the police.  As a result, they did not 
enter the unit or conduct their inspection any 
differently than they otherwise would have 
because of any police intervention.  Similarly, 
when the property managers and staff re-entered 
unit 216 two days later, they did so for the 
purpose of checking the residue of the flood 
damage and, as one of the managers put it, “out 
of curiosity”.  Again, there is no evidence that 
they entered and inspected the unit at the behest 
of or for the benefit of the police or in response to 
a pol ice request or demand.  In these 
circumstances, the trial judge was correct to 
conclude that the defence claims of state action 
had not been made out.
We also observe that ... in the absence of any 
agency issue, police can receive and act on 
information received from a third party and use 
the information to seek the issuance of a search 
warrant; this is precisely what happened in this 
case. [paras. 15-16]
Since there was no s.8 breach, s.24(2) of the Charter 
did not apply. The accuseds’ appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BREACHES OF UNDERTAKINGS 
ARISING FROM SAME ACT NOT 
BARRED  BY KIENAPPLE
R. v. Poker, 2009 NLCA 33  
The accused was released on an 
“Undertaking  to a Peace Officer” 
with a condition that he “abstain 
from communication with Evelyn 
Lidd”. About a month later he was 
again released on another “Undertaking  to a Peace 
Officer” with another condition to “abstain from 
communication with Evelyn Lidd”. A couple of 
months after that he was seen in the company of Ms. 
Lidd, thereby breaching  the two undertakings. Two 
days later he pointed a loaded shotgun at several 
persons and was charged with a number of counts 
arising from that incident.
At trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court on several 
charges, including  the two breach of undertakings 
relating  to Ms. Lidd, the accused was convicted of 
breaching  only one of the undertakings related to her. 
The trial judge stayed one count of breach of 
undertaking  ruling, in part, that “no one should be 
punished twice for the same offence” when “the 
charges arise out of the same incident, where the 
same facts from the same legal point of view are the 
foundation of both charges, and whether there is in 
fact a single wrong.” 
The Crown then appealed the stay of proceedings on 
the basis that the trial judge erred in his application 
of the principle against multiple convictions (known 
as the Kienapple principle). Justice Rowe, writing  the 
judgment for the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, 
agreed with the Crown. He found the trial judge 
mixed the principle against multiple convictions with 
whether the Crown should have chosen to proceed 
on two counts of breaching  the undertaking. On the 
latter point Justice Rowe stated:
I note this as it is important to bear in mind that 
whether the Crown chooses to proceed with a 
charge is a matter within the Crown’s discretion 
and is not a matter for judicial supervision.  The 
judicial function relates to the disposition of 
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charges, rather than to the decision to proceed 
with them. [para. 16]
As for the disposition issue, the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal found that breaches of two undertakings 
arising  from the same act did not offend the rule 
against multiple convictions. In coming  to its 
conclusion the court relied on two earlier cases. In R. 
v. Furlong the same court held that a conviction for 
breach of a recognizance and breach of probation 
(both arising  from the same act) did not offend the 
rule against multiple convictions.  And in R. v. F.
(C.G.) the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld 
convictions for two breach of undertakings. The Court 
in that case stated:
… [A]n offence of this nature [breach of 
undertaking] is “… designed to protect the 
effective operation of the criminal justice 
system.” … The gravamen of the offence is failure 
to abide by the undertaking  to the Court.  Where, 
as here, there are two undertakings, given on 
different days to obtain release with respect to 
different sets of offences charged in different 
Informations, convictions for breach of both of 
these entirely separate undertakings do not 
offend the principle that a person ought not to be 
punished twice for the same wrong.  Two 
promises were made to the court to secure 
release from custody on two separate sets of 
charges.   Two promises were broken by the same 
failure of good behaviour. [para. 50]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the stay of 
proceedings was set aside and a conviction was 
entered for the second count of breach of 
undertaking. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
s.10(b) IMPOSES DUTIES ON 
BOTH THE POLICE & 
THE DETAINEE
R. v. Brown, 2009 NBCA 27 
After stopping  the accused to check 
driver’s documents, a police officer 
noted a smell of alcohol. The officer 
asked the accused to provide a 
sample of his breath in an approved 
screening  device and as a result, along  with his 
observations, provided the officer with grounds to 
believe the accused had been driving  while impaired. 
The officer demanded the accused accompany him to 
the police station to provide a breath sample.  The 
officer informed the accused that he had the right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay and that he 
had the right to contact “a lawyer of [his] own 
choice” or that he could obtain free and immediate 
advice form a Legal Aid lawyer who was available at 
all times. The accused said he understood the 
information and, upon a further inquiry as to whether 
he wanted to exercise his right to counsel, he 
answered “I don’t know right now,” instead asking  to 
call his parents.
At the police station, the accused was given the 
opportunity to contact his parents by telephone, 
speaking  to his mother for approximately 20 minutes. 
LEARNING LEGAL LINGO:
Kineapple Principle
 
“[F]or the Kienapple rule to apply: there must 
be both a factual and legal nexus between the 
several charges.  Multiple convictions are only 
precluded under the Kienapple principle if 
they arise from the same “cause”, “matter”, or 
“delict”, and if there is sufficient proximity 
between the offences charged. This require-
ment of sufficient proximity between offences 
will only be satisfied if there is no additional 
and distinguishing element contained in the 
offence for which a conviction is sought to be 
precluded by the Kienapple principle.” —  
R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480
“[W]hether the Crown chooses to proceed 
with a charge is a matter within the Crown’s 
discretion and is not a matter for judicial 
supervision.  The judicial function relates 
to the disposition of charges, rather than 
to the decision to proceed with them.” 
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Once that call was completed, the officer again asked 
if the accused wanted to speak to a lawyer.  He 
answered in the affirmative but did not specify a 
particular lawyer. The officer called the on-call duty 
counsel, gave the accused the telephone and left the 
room.  The accused spoke to duty counsel, told the 
officer he was ready to provide a breath sample, and 
subsequently provided two breath samples; 110 mg% 
and 100mg%.  
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused claimed that when he spoke to his mother 
he learned of the family lawyer’s name, but felt 
rushed and intimidated by the officer. He did not tell 
the officer of the family lawyer’s name nor ask to 
speak to a particular lawyer. And even after speaking 
to duty counsel he did not mention his family 
lawyer’s name nor ask to speak to a lawyer of his 
choosing. He nonetheless claimed there had been a 
violation of his s.10(b) right to counsel and that the 
certificate of analysis should have been excluded 
under s.24(2). 
The trial judge found the police had violated s.10(b) 
because the officer did not inquire whether the 
accused wanted to speak to counsel of his choice 
thereby breaching  the requirement that the police 
officer act diligently in facilitating  the right of the 
accused to consult counsel of choice. The officer was 
not “reasonably diligent” since he assumed from the 
accused’s answer that he had no specific counsel in 
mind or simply forgot to ask him. Despite finding  a 
breach, the trial judge found it was a minor one and 
the evidence of the certificate was admitted under 
s.24(2). The accused was convicted of over 80mg%.  
The accused’s appeal to the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful. The appeal judge 
concluded that there was no s.10(b) breach at all. In 
her view, it was the accused who had not been 
reasonably diligent in exercising  his right to counsel 
because of his failure to assert a desire to speak to 
private counsel. The appeal was dismissed.  
 
The accused then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal arguing  the appeal judge erred in 
holding  there was no breach of his s.10(b) right to 
counsel and that the evidence should have been 
excluded. Justice Richard, writing  the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal first noted that s.10(b) of the Charter 
imposes on the police both informational and 
implementation duties. In this case, the officer 
complied with the informational duty. Therefore, the 
question was whether the officer complied with the 
implementational duty. 
The implementational component of s.10(b) imposes 
duties on both the police and the detainee. The first 
two duties imposed on the police arise when the 
detainee indicates a desire to contact counsel. The 
police must provide the detainee with a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel (except in urgent and 
dangerous circumstances) and refrain from eliciting 
evidence from the detainee until the reasonable 
opportunity has been provided. The next duty is on 
the detainee to be reasonably diligent in exercising 
their right. If the detainee is not reasonably diligent 
then the duty to refrain from eliciting  evidence will 
be suspended. 
However, Justice Richard found “it is not realistic, in 
every case, to so neatly compartmentalize the 
obligations that arise out of the implementation 
component of the s. 10(b) right” by drawing  a clear 
mark of delineation between the concepts of 
“reasonable opportunity” and “reasonable diligence” 
if all of the circumstances are not considered in 
making the determinations. He continued:
This is so because the main governing  principle, 
in determining questions of “reasonable 
opportunity” and “due diligence”, is the need to 
examine the totality of the circumstances. Thus, 
any analysis that requires a determination of 
“reasonable opportunity” without regard to all the 
circumstances is not the proper approach to the s. 
10(b) analysis. The trier of fact must look at the 
facts globally and determine whether in “all of 
the circumstances” it can be said that the 
detainee was not provided with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the right to counsel. These 
circumstances include not only the behaviour of 
the police, but also that of the detainee.  What 
might be reasonable in some cases might not be 
in others. 
 
A key fact in the determination of what is 
reasonable in the circumstances is the state of 
knowledge of the police. A course of action that 
might be reasonable in some circumstances 
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might be unreasonable if 
undertaken with knowledge 
of certain facts. For example, 
providing a telephone book 
to assist a detainee in 
locating a particular lawyer, 
in some cases, may be most 
relevant to the determination 
of “reasonable opportunity”, 
but providing a telephone 
book, without more, to a 
detainee the police know to 
be illiterate would not be of 
much benefit. Where officers 
know or should know certain 
facts, the reasonable course 
of action may be dictated by 
the state of their knowledge. 
However, where the officers 
are not aware of certain facts 
that are within the exclusive knowledge of the 
detainee, and where the detainee does nothing to 
make the officers aware, a different course of 
action may be indicated. In such a case, regard to 
“all the circumstances” would include whether 
one would reasonably expect the detainee to 
inform the police of certain facts. This would 
depend on factors such as any circumstances that 
might impede or prevent 
the detainee from making 
the facts known to the 
police, including the 
overall atmosphere in 
w h i c h t h e e v e n t s 
occurred. [paras. 23-24]
Here, the trial judge failed 
to consider al l of the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e n 
considering  whether the 
accused was reasonably 
expected to inform the 
police that he wished to 
contact a particular lawyer 
and whether this counted in 
determining  what was a 
reasonable opportunity for 
him to exercise his right to counsel. The officer 
advised the accused of his right to consult with 
counsel of choice or with Legal Aid duty counsel and 
he indicated he understood these rights. When the 
accused asked to speak to his parents, the officer 
facilitated the call.  When 
he asked to speak to 
counsel, without specifying 
a particular lawyer, again, 
the police officer facilitated 
the call.  Once he had 
spoken to duty counsel, the 
accused agreed to supply 
t h e s a m p l e s o f h i s 
breath.  The police officers 
did nothing  to impede or 
prevent the accused from 
exercising  his rights and 
there was noth ing  to 
suggest the officers knew or 
should have known that he 
wanted to call a particular 
lawyer. 
Looking  at all the circumstances, the accused was 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise his 
right. “If he wanted to call a particular lawyer, 
something  which only he knew at the time, all he had 
to do was say so, either once he finished speaking 
with his mother or even once he had spoken to duty 
counsel,” said Justice Richard. “In the prevailing 
atmosphere of cooperation, one 
would reasonably have expected 
him to have informed the officer 
of his choice. [The accused’s] 
failure to convey this information 
to the officer is a relevant factor 
in the determination of whether 
or not the police provided him 
with a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his right to counsel.”  
The opportunity afforded the 
accused to exercise his right to 
counsel was a reasonable one 
and, if he did not consult counsel 
of his choice, it was because he 
was not reasonably diligent in 
the exercise of his right.  
 
The police did not breach the accused’s right to 
counsel and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“A course of action that might be 
reasonable in some circumstances might 
be unreasonable if undertaken with 
knowledge of certain facts. For 
example, providing a telephone book to 
assist a detainee in locating a particular 
lawyer, in some cases, may be most 
relevant to the determination of 
‘reasonable opportunity’, but providing 
a telephone book, without more, to a 
detainee the police know to be illiterate 
would not be of much benefit.” 
“Where officers know or should know 
certain facts, the reasonable course 
of action may be dictated by the 
state of their knowledge. However, 
where the officers are not aware of 
certain facts that are within the 
exclusive knowledge of the detainee, 
and where the detainee does nothing 
to make the officers aware, a 
different course of action may be 
indicated.” 
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FAILURE TO RE-ADVISE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL AT POLICE STATION 
NOT NECESSARILY A BREACH 
R. v. Devries, 2009 ONCA 477  
A police officer saw the accused 
driving  somewhat erratically and 
pulled her over. He immediately 
noticed several indicia of impairment, 
arrested the accused, and advised her 
of her rights under s.10(b) of the Charter.  He then 
asked her if she wished to contact a lawyer “now”. 
The accused said she did not want to call a lawyer 
and a secondary caution advising  her of the charge 
and affording  her the opportunity to make a 
statement was given. A breath demand was made and 
the accused was transported to the police 
detachment, arriving  about 20 minutes after she was 
advised of her rights. She was not given any further 
advice about her right to counsel and two 
breathalyzer tests produced readings of 160mg%. The 
accused was charged with impaired driving  and over 
80mg%.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
argued that she was not given her right to counsel as 
required by s.10(b) of the Charter and that the 
evidence of the breathalyzer 
results should be excluded 
under s.24(2). The trial judge 
rejected this contention, 
finding  that the officer had 
complied with   s.10(b) 
because the accused had 
stated at the roadside that 
she did not wish to speak to 
a lawyer. The accused had 
made an informed decision 
not to consult with counsel 
and the officer had no 
additional obligation to 
further advise her of her 
right to counsel once they 
arrived at the police station. 
The accused was convicted 
of both charges, but the 
impaired driving  conviction 
was stayed.
 
An appeal by the accused to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was successful. The appeal judge 
concluded that the officer was required to advise the 
accused of all legal services or information available 
to her at the police station and to expressly tell her 
that contact with counsel would be made at the 
police station and not at the roadside.  “The 
informational component of section 10(b) was not 
met in the case at bar,” said the judge. “The [accused] 
was also asked if she wanted to speak to counsel on a 
non-existing  phone at the roadside.  The [accused] 
should have been told in no uncertain terms at the 
roadside that upon arrival at the police station a 
phone and a list of callers would have been made 
available to her if she so chose.  This was not done 
and the police breached her s.10(b) rights to call 
counsel before taking  the breath test.” A new trial was 
ordered.
The Crown then successfully appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, despite the accused’s submission 
that she should have been told that she would be 
allowed to contact counsel at the detachment should 
she choose to exercise her right to counsel. Justice 
Doherty, delivering  the unanimous judgment, ruled 
that the police officer was not obliged to tell the 
accused at the roadside that consultation with a 
lawyer would take place at 
t he po l i c e s t a t i o n . I n 
describing  the right that 
arises from s.10(b) of the 
Charter, Justice Doherty 
stated:
Section 10(b) contains two 
distinct rights.  First, it 
obligates the police to 
inform a detainee of his or 
her right to speak with a 
lawyer without delay.  
Second, it guarantees the 
right of a detainee to retain 
and instruct counsel.  If a 
d e t a i n e e ch o o s e s t o 
exercise that right, the 
police must provide the 
detainee with a reasonable 
opportunity to do so and 
“Section 10(b) contains two distinct 
rights. First, it obligates the police to 
inform a detainee of his or her right to 
speak with a lawyer without delay.  
Second, it guarantees the right of a 
detainee to retain and instruct counsel. 
If a detainee chooses to exercise that 
right, the police must provide the 
detainee with a reasonable opportunity 
to do so and must refrain from further 
questioning the detainee or otherwise 
eliciting evidence from the detainee until 
he or she has had a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with counsel.” 
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m u s t r e f r a i n f r o m f u r t h e r 
questioning  the detainee or 
otherwise eliciting  evidence from 
the detainee until he or she has 
had a reasonable opportunity to 
consult with counsel. ... [T]he 
informational component of s. 
10(b) ... places the burden on the 
police to inform the detainee of 
the right to counsel guaranteed to the detainee by 
s. 10(b).
The informational component of s. 10(b) has two 
parts. The first is apparent in the language of the 
section, while the second is a product of the 
jurisprudence.  Section 10(b) expressly requires 
that the detainee be told of his or her right to 
retain and instruct counsel without delay.   ... 
[T]he informational component of s. 10(b) [has 
been extended] to include the requirement that 
the detainee must be informed of the existence 
and availability of duty counsel and Legal Aid. ... 
[The police are required] to inform detainees 
about the availability of counsel through Legal 
Aid, and the availability of immediate free legal 
advice to everyone through duty counsel services 
a s suming  t ho se s e r v i ce s ex i s t i n t he 
jurisdiction.  ...
The requirement that all detainees must be told of 
the existence and means of accessing  duty 
counsel and Legal Aid gives 
the constitutional right to 
counsel found in s. 10(b) real 
meaning. The right would be 
hollow for those unaware of 
how they might obtain 
immediate legal assistance if 
t h e y w e r e g i v e n n o 
information by the authorities 
as to how to access legal 
assistance.  Nor, given the 
dynamics a t p lay in a 
detention situation, should 
the onus be on the detainee 
to make inquiries as to how 
he or she might exercise the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o 
counsel.   [The right sto be 
told of duty counsel and legal 
aid] ensure that all detainees 
have sufficient information to 
make an informed decision 
as to whether to 
speak with counsel 
before submitting to 
police interrogation 
or testing. [references 
o m i t t e d , p a r a s . 
21-23]
In this case the officer 
complied with the informational components of 
s.10(b). She was told she could retain and instruct 
counsel without delay, could telephone any lawyer 
she wanted to call, had the right to access immediate 
free legal advice via the toll-free number given to her, 
and if charged with an offence, she could apply 
through the Legal Aid Plan for legal assistance in 
defending  against the charge. In holding  that 
compliance with s.10(b) does not necessarily require 
the officer to inform the detainee that contact will 
occur when the detainee is taken to the police 
station, Justice Doherty stated:
... I do not think that the use of the word “now” 
in the context of the administration of the s. 10(b) 
caution at the roadside implies that the detainee 
can speak with a lawyer instantly upon the 
officer’s completion of the s. 10(b) caution. Most 
police officers are not standing with a telephone 
in their outstretched hand as they complete the s. 
10(b) caution.  The officer’s statement to a 
detainee at the roadside that 
he or she may speak with a 
l a w y e r “ n o w ” w o u l d 
necessarily convey that the 
right to speak with a lawyer 
was con t ingen t on the 
availability of a telephone 
t h a t w a s u s e a b l e i n 
circumstances that would 
permit the detainee to speak 
with a lawyer for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice.
It is important to distinguish 
between the nature of the 
rights guaranteed by s. 10(b) 
and the further question of 
whether the police have 
properly complied with a 
detainee’s right to consult 
with counsel in any given 
case.  The constitutional right 
“Most police officers are not 
standing with a telephone in their 
outstretched hand as they complete 
the s. 10(b) caution. The officer’s 
statement to a detainee at the 
roadside that he or she may speak 
with a lawyer ‘now’ would 
necessarily convey that the right to 
speak with a lawyer was contingent 
on the availability of a telephone 
that was useable in circumstances 
that would permit the detainee to 
speak with a lawyer for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice.” 
“[T]he informational component of     
s.10(b) ... places the burden on the 
police to inform the detainee of the 
right to counsel guaranteed to the 
detainee by s.10(b).” 
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is the right to speak with a lawyer “without 
delay”. All detainees are entitled to that right and 
must be so advised by the police.   The language 
used by the police cannot suggest that the right to 
speak with a lawyer only arises at some point 
later on in the detention.  If the detainee, having 
been told he or she has a right to speak with a 
lawyer “without delay”, chooses to exercise that 
right, the police must then afford him or her a 
reasonable opportunity to do so.   Whether the 
steps taken by the police to make a telephone 
available to a detainee, in circumstances where 
he or she can speak with counsel, comply with 
the implementational requirements of s. 10(b) 
turns on the facts of the specific case and not on 
whether the police properly informed the 
detainee of his or her right to speak with counsel 
without delay.
In cases involving a roadside detention and a 
breathalyzer demand, all detainees must be told 
that they have the right to speak with a lawyer 
“without delay”.  They must also be told that they 
can access immediate free legal advice using  the 
toll-free number.   Should a detainee choose to 
speak with counsel “without delay”, the police 
must afford him or her the opportunity to do 
so .  Depend ing on the c i rcums tances , 
consultation with counsel “without delay” may 
require a telephone call at the roadside, at the 
police station where the breathalyzer test will be 
administered, or perhaps in very unusual cases, 
somewhere else.  It will all depend on the facts of 
the particular case. Questions of where and when 
consultation with counsel will occur are properly 
considered as part of the implementational phase 
of the rights guaranteed by s. 10(b).
There are insurmountable practical problems 
associated with incorporating  into the s. 10(b) 
caution the requirement that the officer tell the 
detained person where the communication with 
counsel will occur should the detained person 
choose to speak with counsel.   Police officers, 
when advising a detained person of his or her 
right to counsel under s. 10(b), will often not 
know all of the facts that may be relevant to 
where and when access to counsel must be 
provided to comply with the implementational 
component of s. 10(b) should the detainee elect 
to consult with counsel.   For example, the 
arresting  officer may believe that the consultation 
with counsel must occur at the police station 
because the arresting officer does not know that 
the detainee has a cell phone that works in the 
location where the arrest occurs.  In that case, an 
indication to the detainee that any contact with 
counsel must be made at the station might well 
misinform the detainee as to the nature of his or 
her s. 10(b) rights should the detainee elect to 
contact counsel.   I t may be that the 
implementational requirements of s. 10(b) would 
require that the detainee be allowed to make the 
call from the roadside.
The practical difficulties that would be created by 
requiring arresting  officers to tell detainees where 
and when they can exercise their s. 10(b) rights as 
part of the informational component of s. 10(b) is 
not limited to the roadside arrest/breathalyzer 
demand situation.   In most arrest situations, the 
arresting  officer will not be in a position to hand 
the detained person a telephone immediately 
upon completing the s. 10(b) caution.   In these 
situations, there will inevitably be some time gap 
in time and place between the detained person’s 
assertion of his or her wish to speak with counsel 
and the availability of the means of effecting that 
communication with counsel. ... [paras. 30-34]  
And further, on the wording  used by police to convey 
the informational component: 
It is fruitless to search for phrasing  that does not 
have any potential to mislead anybody in any 
given situation. Rather than pursuing the hopeless 
task of finding absolutely unambiguous language, 
compliance with s. 10(b) must be measured by its 
ability to convey the essential character of the s. 
10(b) rights to the detainee – the right to 
immediate access to a lawyer, including access 
through the toll-free number to immediate free 
legal advice.
There is value in the use of a standardized s. 
10(b) caution which complies with the 
informational requirements established in the 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.  
Attempts to graft onto the standardized caution 
fact-specific information as to where and when 
the detainee can exercise the right to counsel, if 
he or she chooses to do so, is more calculated to 
create litigation than to advance the purposes of 
the constitutional right protected by s. 10(b).
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I ... do not suggest that the 
police are never obligated 
t o g o b e y o n d t h e 
information required to 
c o m p l y w i t h t h e 
informational component 
of s. 10(b). Questions or 
comments made by a 
d e t a i n e e o r o t h e r 
circumstances at the time 
the s.10(b) caution is 
given may indicate a misunderstanding  by the 
detainee of the nature of the s. 10(b) rights.   In 
those circumstances, the arresting officer will 
have to provide a further explanation of the 
rights ... [paras. 36-38]
In this case, the accused did not suggest that she did 
not understand what she was told about the right to 
counsel or that she was misled into believing  that her 
only choice was to contact counsel from the back of 
the police cruiser at the roadside.  She was invited to 
consult with counsel “now” and unequivocally 
declined that opportunity. “[T]here is nothing 
inherently misleading  in telling  a detainee at the 
roadside that he or she can speak with a lawyer 
‘now’,” said Justice Doherty. “[T]hat phraseology 
conveys the immediacy of the detainee’s entitlement 
to speak with a lawyer. The further question of what 
the police must do to make good on that offer arises 
if and when the detainee chooses to exercise the right 
to speak with a lawyer ‘without delay’.” He 
continued:
The language used by [the officer] conveyed to 
the [accused] that she could speak with a lawyer 
without delay if she wanted to do so. Combined 
with the information he gave her concerning  how 
she could access counsel immediately through 
the toll-free number, the [accused] was armed 
with all the information she needed to make an 
informed decision as to whether she wanted to 
speak with a lawyer before submitting to the 
breathalyzer demand.
I would add one further comment with respect to 
[the officer’] failure to re-advise the [accused] of 
her right to counsel when [they] arrived at the 
detachment.   ...   Where a detainee has been 
properly cautioned at the roadside and has 
indicated that he or she does not wish to speak 
with a lawyer, failure to 
re-advise the detainee of 
his or her right to counsel 
at the police station does 
not necessarily constitute 
a breach of s. 10(b).   That 
said, however, I think that 
in cases such as this, it 
would be a much better 
practice for the police, 
u p o n a r r i va l a t t h e 
detachment, to reiterate the right to counsel.  A 
simple repetition of the right to counsel and an 
invitation to a detainee to speak with counsel 
“now”, if he or she wishes to do so, would serve 
two purposes.  First, it would reinforce the 
fundamental importance of the right to counsel 
and the need for all participants in the justice 
sys tem to recognize tha t fundamenta l 
importance.  Second, it would effectively short-
circuit any claim at trial by a detainee that he or 
she was misled at the roadside by the use of the 
universal s. 10(b) caution into believing  that the 
right to counsel could only be exercised then and 
there.  Given the right circumstances, and absent 
a reiteration of the right to counsel at the police 
station, that argument could succeed. [paras. 
41-42]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction restored.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Legally Speaking:
Voluntary Statement
“It is trite law that a statement by an 
accused person to a person in authority 
must be shown to have been voluntary 
in the legal sense before it can be 
received in evidence. This is so whether 
the statement is to be tendered by the 
Crown as part of its case or is to be put 
to the accused person in cross-
examination should he testify.” - British 
Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Low in R. v. D.W.N. , 2009 
BCCA 317 at para. 6.
“Where a detainee has been properly 
cautioned at the roadside and has 
indicated that he or she does not wish to 
speak with a lawyer, failure to re-advise 
the detainee of his or her right to counsel 
at the police station does not necessarily 
constitute a breach of s. 10(b).” 
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GROUNDS OBJECTIVELY 
JUSTIFIED: NO ss.8 or 9 
BREACHES MADE OUT
R. v. Murtezovski, 2009 ONCA 423
The police intercepted a package 
addressed to “K. Woodhouse” that 
contained three bricks of cocaine. The 
cocaine was removed and replaced 
with three similar-looking  bricks 
containing  flour and 20 grams of cocaine in the 
wrapping  of one of the bricks. They then arranged for 
a “controlled delivery” to K. Woodhouse’s address by 
an officer disguised as a UPS worker. While 
surveilling  the residence police observed K. 
Woodhouse and another person leave separately in 
two of three vehicles parked at the residence shortly 
before the delivery. The accused’s father’s car was the 
only car that remained outside.  
After delivering  the package, the accused took it and 
signed his own name. Ten minutes later the police 
saw the accused leave the residence in his car with a 
gym bag. He was stopped” and arrested for 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
When the police entered the vehicle they found the 
gym bag  with three plastic bags containing  the 
“cocaine” bricks still sealed and unopened. The 
accused also had a marijuana joint and twenty grams 
of hashish. He was charged with conspiracy to 
possess cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 
possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 
and possession of marijuana and cannabis resin for 
the purpose of trafficking.  
During  a pre-trial motion the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice dismissed the accused’s arguments that his 
ss. 8  and 9 Charter rights were breached. The 
conspiracy charge was dismissed but the accused was 
convicted of possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking  and simple possession of marijuana and 
simple possession of cannabis resin as an included 
offence in the count of possessing  for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the police did not have reasonable 
grounds to arrest him. His submission, however, was 
rejected. The Court stated:
It was not contested that the officer who decided 
the [accused] should be arrested subjectively 
believed he had reasonable grounds to arrest 
him.  The circumstances viewed in combination 
also met the objective standard required.  The 
[accused], who was the only person apparently in 
the house at the time of the delivery, after 
physically receiving the package, left shortly 
thereafter with a bag  capable of carrying  what 
had been delivered. [para. 9]
The accused’s Charter rights were not breached and, 
even if they were, the evidence would not be 
excluded. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR BREATH 
DEMAND NOT NEEDED: 
RPG SUFFICIENT
R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35
A police officer saw the accused’s 
vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign and 
then begin to travel at 20 to 25 km/h 
over the posted speed limit. The 
officer activated his police car’s siren 
and lights to pull the vehicle over. The vehicle slowed 
down but did not stop. It then accelerated and 
changed lanes multiple times over approximately a 
three km distance before finally pulling  over. The  
officer approached the vehicle and informed the 
accused that he was under arrest for failing  to stop for 
the police. The accused explained that he had not 
stopped because he thought the police car was an 
ambulance.  The officer noted the accused looked 
lethargic, fatigued and had red eyes. He could smell 
alcohol on his breath and also noted that his 
movements and speech were slow and deliberate. 
The officer formed the opinion that the accused was 
“intoxicated”, read the Charter  warning, and made a 
breathalyzer demand. The accused provided samples 
of his breath and was charged with impaired driving, 
over 80mg%, and fail to stop for police. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the accused 
was acquitted of all charges. Although the officer 
subjectively believed that the accused’s ability to 
drive was impaired by alcohol, his belief was not 
objectively reasonable given the accused’s 
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explanation that he thought 
the police car was an 
ambulance.  In the trial 
j u d g e ’ s v i e w , t h i s 
explanation was just as valid 
to explain the erratic driving 
as the suggestion that he 
was impaired by alcohol. 
Since the officer did not 
have the necessary grounds 
to demand a breath sample, the accused’s s.8  Charter 
rights were breached and the evidence of the breath 
results were excluded under s.24(2). Furthermore, the 
accused’s explanation also provided a reasonable 
doubt as to whether he had the intention to evade 
police when he failed to stop. 
  
A Crown appeal on the impaired driving  and over 
80mg% charges to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful. The appeal judge 
held there was ample evidence to support the finding 
that the officer did not have objective grounds to 
make the demand. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed.
A further appeal by Crown to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal was successful. A majority  of the Court of 
Appeal found the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the accused’s ability 
to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. 
In the majority’s view, the trial judge failed to give 
sufficient consideration to the officer’s opinion that 
the accused was intoxicated, while at the same time 
gave too much weight to the accused’s evidence that 
he thought the police car was an ambulance. A new 
trial was ordered.
The accused then appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada 
arguing  the officer lacked the 
requisite grounds to make a 
breathalyzer demand thereby 
breaching  his Charter rights. 
But an unanimous court 
dismissed the appeal and 
confirmed the order of a new 
trial. “Section 254(3) of the 
Criminal Code ... requires that 
an officer have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the 
suspect has committed an 
offence under s. 253 of the Code 
(impaired driving  or over 80) 
before making  a breathalyzer 
demand,” said the Court. “The 
requirement in s. 254(3) that 
r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r o b a b l e 
grounds exist is not only a 
statutory but a constitutional 
requirement as a precondition to 
a lawful search and seizure under s. 8  of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”  On the 
issue of reasonable grounds and the resultant breath 
demand and testing, the Court stated:
... where evidence is obtained as a result of a 
warrantless search or seizure, the onus is on the 
Crown to show that the search or seizure was 
reasonable.  A search will be reasonable if it is 
authorized by law, the law itself is reasonable, 
and the manner in which the search was carried 
out is reasonable.  No issue is taken with the 
manner in which the search was carried out or 
the reasonableness of the breath demand 
provisions in the Code. Rather, the only question 
is whether the arresting officer complied with the 
statutory pre-conditions for a valid breath 
demand.
... s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code requires that the 
officer have reasonable grounds to believe that 
within the preceding three hours, the accused has 
committed, or is committing, an offence under s. 
253 of the Criminal Code.  The onus is on the 
Crown to prove that the officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the demand 
because the Crown seeks to rely on breath 
samples obtained as a result of a warrantless 
search.  It would also be impractical to place the 
burden on the accused 
because evidence of the 
presence or absence of 
reasonable and probable 
g r o u n d s i s w i t h i n t h e 
“peculiar knowledge” of the 
Crown. 
... there is both a subjective 
and an objective component 
to establishing reasonable 
and probable grounds; that 
is, the officer must have an 
honest belief that the suspect 
“[T]here is both a subjective and an 
objective component to establishing 
reasonable and probable grounds; 
that is, the officer must have an 
honest belief that the suspect 
committed an offence under s. 253 of 
the Criminal Code, and there must be 
reasonable grounds for this belief.” 
“The onus is on the Crown to prove 
that the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to make the 
demand because the Crown seeks to 
rely on breath samples obtained as a 
result of a warrantless search.” 
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committed an offence under s. 253 of the 
Criminal Code, and there must be reasonable 
grounds for this belief. ... [references omitted, 
paras. 15-17] 
In this case there was no dispute about whether the 
officer had the necessary subjective belief; the issue 
was whether the subjective belief was objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances. In finding  the trial 
judge erred and the indicia of impairment did 
amount at law to reasonable and probable grounds to 
make the breath demand, the Court held:
With respect, it is our view that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that the officer’s subjective belief 
of impairment was not objectively supported on 
the facts. The officer’s belief was based not only 
on the accused’s erratic driving pattern but also 
on the various indicia of impairment which he 
observed after he arrested [the accused]. The trial 
judge placed substantial weight on [the 
accused’s] explanation that he thought the police 
vehicle was an ambulance. Leaving aside the fact 
that this confusion itself can be a sign of 
impairment, it is important to note that the officer 
need not have anything  more than reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that the driver 
committed the offence of impaired driving or 
driving  “over 80” before making  the demand. He 
need not demonstrate a prima facie case for 
conviction before pursuing  his investigation.  In 
our view, there was ample evidence to support 
the officer’s subjective belief that [the accused] 
had committed an offence under s. 253 of the 
Criminal Code.   We therefore conclude that the 
officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
make the breath demand... [para. 23]  
Since there was ample evidence to objectively 
support the officer’s subjective belief that the 
accused’s ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, 
the officer’s breathalyzer demand was lawful, and the 
accused’s Charter rights were not violated. Therefore, 
there  was no reason to resort to s.24(2).    
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
DESPITE UNLAWFUL 
DETENTION, GUN ADMITTED
R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32
Three police officers were patrolling 
in the area of four schools with a 
history of student assaults, robberies 
and drug  offences over the lunch 
h o u r. Tw o o f f i c e r s w e r e i n 
plainclothes driving  an unmarked car. They were 
monitoring  the area and maintaining  a safe student 
environment. A third officer was in uniform, driving  a 
marked car, and doing  directed patrols in order to 
maintain a visible police presence, provide student 
reassurance and deter crime during  the lunch hour 
period. The plainclothes officers asked the uniformed 
officer to stop the accused and chat with him after 
they saw him walk by in a “suspicious” manner. He 
had “stared” at the officers in an unusual manner and 
“fidgeted” with his pants and coat, which looked 
suspicious. The uniformed officer stood in the 
accused’s path on the sidewalk, told him to keep his 
hands in front of him, and began to question him. 
The two plainclothes officers arrived and stood 
behind the uniformed officer. The accused was 
initially only asked for identification, but then he was 
asked if he had ever been arrested and whether he 
had anything  on him he shouldn’t. Although initially 
saying  “no,” he did say he had a small amount of 
marihuana and, when asked if there was anything 
else, admitted to having  a loaded revolver. The 
accused was arrested, his revolver seized from his 
waist pouch, and he was charged with five firearms 
offences.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused’s 
motion to exclude the gun from evidence because his 
rights under ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had 
been violated was dismissed. The trial judge found 
there was no detention nor did the officer’s inquiries 
amount to a search under s.8. He ruled that the 
conversation between the uniformed officer and the 
accused was merely “chit chat”, while the officer’s 
statement for the accused to keep his hands in front 
of him was a “request”, not a “direction or demand.” 
Finally, the accused could have simply walked 
around the officers and kept going. He was convicted 
Note-able Quote
“If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary” - James Madison
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of the firearm offences and sentenced to 18  months 
imprisonment.  
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was dismissed. The Court of Appeal did rule there 
was a detention during  the conversation prior to the 
accused’s incriminating  statements and that the 
detention was arbitrary because the officer had no 
reasonable grounds for the detention. The gun was 
characterized as derivative evidence from a s.9 
Charter breach, but nonetheless admissible under 
s.24(2), so the convictions were upheld. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada continuing  to argue that he was arbitrarily 
detained and should have been advised of his right to 
a lawyer before he was questioned and provided the 
inculpatory answers that led to the discovery of the 
firearm. And if he was not detained, he submitted that 
his rights under s.8  of the Charter were breached. As 
a consequence of the violations, he suggested the 
evidence should have been excluded under s.24(2). 
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
accused was not detained until he disclosed his 
firearm and the police arrested him, at which point 
they advised him of his right to talk to a lawyer. The 
Crown argued that the officers were engaged in a 
dynamic, community policing  interaction and the 
preliminary, non-coercive questioning  pursuant to 
police policy was a legitimate exercise of 
investigative police powers essential to the effective 
fulfilment of their duty to enforce the law, and did not 
amount to detention triggering the right to counsel.
What is a Detention?
All seven judges agreed that the accused had been 
detained, although there was division on how to 
determine whether a detention occurred. The 
majority (5 judges) interpreted a “detention” 
generously, yet purposively, and broadly recognized 
the purpose of s.9 is to “protect individual liberty 
from unjustified state interference”. Section “9 guards 
not only against unjustified state intrusions upon 
physical liberty, but also against incursions on mental 
liberty by prohibiting  the coercive pressures of 
detention and imprisonment from being  applied to 
people without adequate justification,” said the 
majority.  “The detainee’s interest in being  able to 
make an informed choice whether to walk away or 
speak to the police is unaffected by the manner in 
which the detention is brought about.” Furthermore, 
when someone is detained, s.10(b) is engaged. This 
relationship between detention and the right to 
counsel was described by the majority this way:
“Detention” also identifies the point at which 
rights subsidiary to detention, such as the right to 
counsel, are triggered. These rights are engaged 
by the vulnerable position of the person who has 
been taken into the effective control of the state 
authorities. They are principally concerned with 
addressing  the imbalance of power between the 
state and the person under its control. More 
specifically, they are designed to ensure that the 
person whose liberty has been curtailed retains 
an informed and effective choice whether to 
speak to state authorities, consistent with the 
overarching principle against self-incrimination.  
They also ensure that the person who is under the 
control of the state be afforded the opportunity to 
seek legal advice in order to assist in regaining 
his or her liberty.  ... 
By setting  limits on the power of the state and 
imposing obligations with regard to the detained 
person through the concept of detention, the 
Charter seeks to effect a balance between the 
interests of the detained individual and those of 
the state. The power of the state to curtail an 
individual’s liberty by way of detention cannot be 
exercised arbitrarily and attracts a reciprocal 
obligation to accord the individual legal 
protection against the state’s superior power. 
[para. 22-23]
The Court found that a detention occurs when a state 
agent suspends an individual’s liberty interest by a 
significant physical or psychological restraint. 
Psychological restraint occurs when:
1. a subject is legally required to comply with a 
direction or demand (eg. roadside breath sample 
demand); or
2. there is no legal obligation to comply with a 
restrictive or coercive demand, but  a reasonable 
person in the subject’s position would feel so 
obligated. This can be difficult to consistently 
define but the question to ask is “whether the 
police conduct would cause a reasonable person 
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to conclude that he or 
she was not free to go 
and had to comply with 
the police direction or 
demand.” The test is 
objective, taking  into 
a c c o u n t t h e e n t i r e 
circumstances of the 
situation, including  the 
conduct of the police.  
Objective Test
In determining  whether a person is detained, the 
court will use an objective test based on the totality 
of the circumstances:
The objective nature of this inquiry recognizes 
that the police must be able to know when a 
detention occurs, in order to allow them to fulfill 
their attendant obligations under the Charter and 
afford the individual its added protections.  
However, the subjective intentions of the police 
are not determinative. (Questions such as police 
“good faith” may become relevant when the test 
for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) is 
applied, in cases where a Charter breach is 
found.) While the test is objective, the individual’s 
particular circumstances and perceptions at the 
t ime may be relevant in assessing the 
reasonableness of any perceived power 
imbalance between the individual and the police, 
and thus the reasonableness of any perception 
that he or she had no choice but to comply with 
the police directive.  To answer the question 
whether there is a detention involves a realistic 
appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, 
not a minute parsing of words and movements. In 
those situations where the police may be 
uncertain whether their conduct is having a 
coercive effect on the individual, it is open to 
them to inform the subject in unambiguous terms 
that he or she is under no obligation to answer 
questions and is free to go. It is for the trial judge, 
applying the proper legal principles to the 
particular facts of the case, to determine whether 
the line has been crossed between police 
conduct that respects liberty and the individual’s 
right to choose, and conduct that does not. [para. 
32]
Aspects of an encounter a court 
s h o u l d c o n s i d e r w h e n 
determining  whether a person 
was psychologically detained, 
in the absence of a legal 
obligation to comply, include 
the circumstances of the 
encounter, the nature of the 
police conduct (how they acted 
and what they said), and the 
characteristics of the individual:
• circumstances of the encounter
‣ were the police making  general inquiries, 
providing  general assistance, or maintaining 
general order or did they have a focussed 
suspicion on a particular individual? 
• conduct of the police
‣ language used;
‣ physical contact;
‣ the place where the interaction occurred;
‣ the presence of others;
‣ length of the encounter. “Consider the act of a 
police officer placing  his or her hand on an 
individual’s arm,” said the majority.  “If 
sustained, it might well lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that his or her freedom to 
choose whether to cooperate or not has been 
removed.  On the other hand, a fleeting  touch 
may not, depending  on the circumstances, give 
rise to a reasonable conclusion that one’s 
liberty has been curtailed. At the same time, it 
must be remembered that situations can move 
quickly, and a single forceful act or word may 
be enough to cause a reasonable person to 
conclude that his or her right to choose how to 
respond has been removed.”
• characteristics of the individual
‣ age;
‣ physical stature;
‣ minority status;
‣ level of sophistication.
“s.9 guards not only against unjustified 
state intrusions upon physical liberty, 
but also against incursions on mental 
liberty by prohibiting the coercive 
pressures of detention and 
imprisonment from being applied to 
people without adequate 
justification.” 
Volume 9 Issue 4 - July/August 2009
PAGE 25
Non-Detentions
It is clear at one end of the police/
citizen encounter spectrum that a 
detention overlaps with arrest or 
imprisonment and that a legal 
obligation to comply with a police 
demand or direction, such as a 
breath sample demand at the 
roadside, is a s. 9 detention.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, however, 
are “encounters between individual 
and [the] police where it would be 
clear to a reasonable person that the 
individual is not being  deprived of a meaningful 
choice whether or not to cooperate with a police 
demand or directive and hence not detained.” The 
Court then went on to describe three common 
encounters where there would be no detention:
• Non-Adversarial Assists or Information Gathering
We may rule out at the outset situations where 
the police are acting in a non-adversarial role and 
assisting  members of the public in circumstances 
commonly accepted as lacking  the essential 
character of a detention.  In many common 
situations, reasonable people understand that the 
police are not constraining individual choices, 
but rather helping people or gathering 
information.  For instance, the reasonable person 
would understand that a police officer who 
attends at a medical emergency on a 911 call is 
not detaining the individuals he 
or she encounters. This is so even 
if the police in taking control of 
the situation, effectively interfere 
with an individual’s freedom of 
movement. Such deprivations of 
liberty will not be significant 
enough to attract Charter scrutiny 
because they do not attract legal 
consequences for the concerned 
individuals. [para. 36]
• Preliminary Investigation
Another often-discussed situation 
is when police officers approach 
bystanders in the wake of an 
accident or crime, to determine if 
they witnessed the event and 
obtain information that may assist 
in their investigation.   While 
many people may be happy 
to assist the police, the law is 
clear that, subject to specific 
p r o v i s i o n s t h a t m a y 
exceptionally govern, the 
citizen is free to walk away. 
Given the existence of such 
a generally understood right 
in such circumstances, a 
reasonable person would not 
conclude that his or her right 
t o ch o o s e wh e t h e r t o 
cooperate with them has 
been taken away. This 
conclusion holds true even if the person may feel 
compelled to cooperate with the police out of a 
sense of moral or civic duty. ...
In the context of investigating an accident or a 
crime, the police,   unbeknownst to them at that 
point in time, may find themselves asking 
questions of a person who is implicated in the 
occurrence and, consequently, is at risk of self-
incrimination. This does not preclude the police 
from continuing  to question the person in the 
pursuit of their investigation.   Section 9 of the 
Charter does not require that police abstain from 
interacting with members of the public until they 
have specific grounds to connect the individual to 
the commission of a crime. Nor does s. 10 
require that the police advise everyone at the 
outset of any encounter that they have no 
obligation to speak to them and are entitled to 
legal counsel.
Effective law enforcement is 
highly dependent on the 
cooperation of members of the 
public. The police must be 
able to act in a manner that 
fosters this cooperation, not 
discourage it. However, police 
investigative powers are not 
without limits. The notion of 
p sycho log ica l de ten t ion 
recognizes the reality that 
police tactics, even in the 
absence of exercising  actual 
physical restraint, may be 
coercive enough to effectively 
remove the individual’s choice 
to walk away from the police. 
“In many common situations, 
reasonable people understand 
that the police are not 
constraining individual choices, 
but rather helping people or 
gathering information. For 
instance, the reasonable person 
would understand that a police 
officer who attends at a medical 
emergency on a 911 call is not 
detaining the individuals he or 
she encounters.” 
“Effective law enforcement is 
highly dependent on the 
cooperation of members of the 
public. The police must be able 
to act in a manner that fosters 
this cooperation, not 
discourage it. However, police 
investigative powers are not 
without limits.” 
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This creates the risk that the person may 
reasonably feel compelled to incriminate himself 
or herself.   Where that is the case, the police are 
no longer entitled simply to expect cooperation 
from an individual. Unless, as stated earlier, the 
police inform the person that he or she is under 
no obligation to answer questions and is free to 
go, a detention may well crystallize and, when it 
does, the police must provide the subject with his 
or her s. 10(b) rights. That the obligation arises 
only on detention represents part of the balance 
between, on the one hand, the individual rights 
protected by ss. 9 and 10 and enjoyed by all 
members of society, and on the other, the 
collective interest of all members of society in the 
ability of the police to act on their behalf to 
investigate and prevent crime. [references 
omitted, para. 37-39] 
• Neighbourhood or Community Policing
A more complex situation may arise in the 
context of neighbourhood policing where the 
police are not responding to any specific 
occurrence, but where the non-coercive police 
role of assisting in meeting needs or maintaining 
basic order can subtly merge with the potentially 
coercive police role of investigating crime and 
arresting  suspects so that they may be brought to 
justice.  This is the situation that arises in this 
case. 
... [G]eneral inquiries by a patrolling officer 
present no threat to freedom of choice.  On the 
other hand, such inquiries can escalate into 
situations where the focus shifts from general 
community-oriented concern to suspicion of a 
particular individual. Focussed suspicion, in and 
of itself, does not turn the encounter in a 
detention. What matters is how the police, based 
on that suspicion, interacted with the subject. The 
language of the Charter does not confine 
detention to situations where a person is in 
potential jeopardy of arrest.  However, this is a 
factor that may help to determine whether, in a 
particular circumstance, a reasonable person 
would conclude he or she had no choice but to 
comply with a police officer’s request.  The police 
must be mindful that, depending on how they act 
and what they say, the point may be reached 
where a reasonable person, in the position of that 
individual, would conclude he or she is not free 
to choose to walk away or decline to answer 
questions. [paras. 40-41] 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Psychological Detention
“In summary, we conclude as follows:
1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter 
refers to a suspension of the individual’s 
liberty interest by a significant physical or 
psychological restraint. Psychological 
detention is established either where the 
individual has a legal obligation to comply 
with the restrictive request or demand, or a 
reasonable person would conclude by 
reason of the state conduct that he or she 
had no choice but to comply.
2. In cases where there is no physical restraint 
or legal obligation, it may not be clear 
whether a person has been detained. To 
determine whether the reasonable person in 
the individual’s circumstances would 
conclude that he or she had been deprived 
by the state of the liberty of choice, the court 
may consider, inter alia, the following 
factors:
a)  The circumstances giving rise to the 
encounter as would reasonably be 
perceived by the individual: whether the 
p o l i c e w e r e p r ov i d i n g g e n e ra l 
assistance; maintaining general order; 
making general inquiries regarding a 
particular occurrence; or, singling out 
the individual for focussed investigation.
b) The nature of the police conduct, 
including the language used; the use of 
physical contact; the place where the 
interaction occurred; the presence of 
others; and the duration of the 
encounter.
c) The part icular characteris t ics or 
circumstances of the individual where 
relevant, including  age; physical stature; 
minority status; level of sophistication.”
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Was the Accused Detained?
Because this was not a clear case of physical restraint 
or compulsion by operation of law, the Court needed 
to consider all the relevant circumstances to 
determine if a reasonable person in the accused’s 
position would have concluded 
that their right to choose how to 
interact with the police (i.e. 
whether to leave or comply) had 
been removed. At the point the 
uniformed officer stepped in the 
accused’s path and made 
general inquiries there was no 
detention. “Such preliminary 
questioning  is a legitimate 
exercise of police powers,” said 
the Court. “At this stage, a 
reasonable person would not 
have concluded he or she was 
being  deprived of the right to 
choose how to act, and for that 
reason there was no detention.” 
However, once he was told to 
keep his hands in front of him 
he was detained. Although 
telling  him to do this by itself may be insufficient to 
indicate detention since it may be simply a 
precautionary directive, looking  at the entire context 
of what transpired from this point forward led the 
Court to conclude the accused was detained when 
the uniformed officer told him to keep his hands in 
front of him, the other two officers moved into 
position, and the officer embarked on a pointed line 
of questioning:
Two other officers approached, flashing  their 
badges and taking tactical adversarial positions 
behind [the uniformed officer]. The encounter 
developed into one where [the accused] was 
singled out as the object of particularized 
suspicion, as evidenced by the conduct of the 
officers. The nature of the questioning changed 
from ascertaining the appellant’s identity to 
determining  whether he “had anything that he 
shouldn’t”. At this point the encounter took on 
the character of an interrogation, going  from 
general neighbourhood policing to a situation 
where the police had effectively taken control 
over the appellant and were attempting  to elicit 
incriminating information. 
Although [the uniformed officer] was respectful in 
his questioning, the encounter was inherently 
intimidating. The power imbalance was obviously 
exacerbated by [the accused’s] youth and 
inexperience.   [The accused] did not testify, so 
we do not know what his perceptions of the 
interaction actually were. 
However, because the test is 
an objective one, this is not 
fatal to his argument that there 
was a detention. ... In our 
view, the evidence supports 
[the accused’s] contention that 
a reasonable person in his 
position (18  years old, alone, 
faced by three physically 
larger policemen in adversarial 
positions) would conclude that 
his or her right to choose how 
to act had been removed by 
t h e p o l i c e , g ive n t h e i r 
conduct.
The police conduct that gave 
rise to an impression of control 
was not fleeting. The direction 
to [the accused] to keep his 
hands in f ront, in i tsel f 
inconclusive, was followed by 
the appearance of two other officers flashing their 
badges and by questioning driven by focussed 
suspicion of [the accused]. The sustained and 
restrictive tenor of the conduct after the direction 
to [the accused] to keep his hands in front of him 
reasonably supports the conclusion that the 
officers were putting him under their control and 
depriving him of his choice as to how to respond. 
[paras. 49-51]
Was the Detention Arbitrary? 
If a detention is lawful it will not be arbitrary under 
s.9 unless the law authorizing  the detention is itself 
arbitrary. Said another way, an unlawful detention 
will be arbitrary and will violate the Charter. This is 
similar to the s.8 framework that held a search will be 
reasonable, in part, if it is authorized by a reasonable 
law. “[I]t should now be understood that for a 
detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be authorized 
by a law which is itself non-arbitrary,” said the Court. 
“[A]s with other rights, the s. 9 prohibition of 
arbitrary detention may be limited under s. 1 by such 
measures ‘prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
“[G]eneral inquiries by a patrolling 
officer present no threat to 
freedom of choice. On the other 
hand, such inquiries can escalate 
into situations where the focus 
shifts from general community-
oriented concern to suspicion of a 
particular individual. Focussed 
suspicion, in and of itself, does 
not turn the encounter in a 
detention. What matters is how the 
police, based on that suspicion, 
interacted with the subject.” 
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justified in a free and democratic 
society’”. 
In this case the officers said they did 
not have legal grounds or reasonable 
suspicion to detain the accused prior 
to his incriminating  statements. The 
detention was therefore arbitrary and 
breached s.9.
Was s.10(b) Breached?
Relying  on  R. v. Suberu the Court 
concluded that the s.10(b) right to 
counsel arose immediately upon 
detention, whether or not the 
detention was solely for investigative purposes. Thus, 
s.10(b) required the police to advise the accused that 
he had the right to speak to a lawyer and to give him 
a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice if he 
so chose, before proceeding  to elicit incriminating 
information from him. Since the police didn’t comply 
with s.10(b) (because they didn’t believe there was a 
detention) they breached the accused’s s.10(b) rights.  
Was the Evidence Admissible?
Before determining  whether the evidence should be 
admitted or excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter, 
the Court revised its prior approach of grouping  the 
factors to be considered under trial fairness 
(conscriptive or non-conscriptive evidence), the 
seriousness of the Charter breach, and the effect of 
excluding  the evidence on the repute of the 
administration of justice. 
The Purpose of s.24(2)
Section 24(2) reads:
Although the administration 
of justice is generally used 
to describe the process by 
which a law breaker is 
investigated, charged and 
tr ied, i t more broadly 
embraces maintaining  the 
rule of law and upholding 
Charter rights in the justice 
system. The Court described 
the focus of s.24(2) as:
The phrase “bring  the 
administration of justice 
into disrepute” must be 
u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e 
long‑term sense of maintaining  the integrity of, 
and public confidence in, the justice system. 
Exclusion of evidence resulting  in an acquittal 
may provoke immediate criticism.  But s. 24(2) 
does not focus on immediate reaction to the 
individual case.  Rather, it looks to whether the 
overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the 
long term, will be adversely affected by 
admission of the evidence.  The inquiry is 
objective.  It asks whether a reasonable person, 
informed of all relevant circumstances and the 
values underlying  the Charter, would conclude 
that the admission of the evidence would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Section 24(2)’s focus is not only long-term, but 
prospective. The fact of the Charter breach means 
damage has already been done to the 
administration of justice. Section 24(2) starts from 
that proposition and seeks to ensure that 
evidence obtained through that breach does not 
do further damage to the 
repute of the justice system. 
Finally, s. 24(2)’s focus is 
societal. Section 24(2) is not 
aimed at punishing the 
p o l i c e o r p r o v i d i n g 
c o m p e n s a t i o n t o t h e 
accused, but rather at 
systemic concerns. The s. 
24(2) focus is on the broad 
impact of admission of the 
evidence on the long-term 
repute of the justice system. 
[paras. 68-70]
“s. 24(2)’s focus is 
societal. Section 24(2) is not 
aimed at punishing the police or 
providing compensation to the 
accused, but rather at systemic 
concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on 
the broad impact of admission of 
the evidence on the long-term 
repute of the justice system.” 
“[I]t should now be understood 
that for a detention to be non-
arbitrary, it must be authorized 
by a law which is itself non-
arbitrary. ... [T]he s. 9 prohibition 
of arbitrary detention may be 
limited under s. 1 by such 
measures ‘prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society’”.
Where, in proceedings under 
subsection (1), a court concludes that 
evidence was obtained  in  a manner 
that infringed or denied any rights or 
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, 
the evidence shall be excluded if it is 
established that, having regard to all 
the circumstances, the admission of 
it in the proceedings would bring  the 
administrat ion of just ice into 
disrepute.
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A New Approach
In assessing  and balancing  the effect of admitting 
Charter tainted evidence on society’s confidence in the 
justice system, the new approach requires a court to 
look at the following three lines of enquiry and 
determine whether, considering all the circumstances, 
admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute: 
3. Seriousness of the Charter-Infringing 
Conduct. 
‣ Would admitting  the evidence send a message 
to the public that the courts condone the state’s 
unlawful conduct by failing  to dissociate 
themselves from the fruits of it?
‣ Was the Charter  breach severe or deliberate or 
was it inadvertent or minor?  The more severe 
the breach the greater need for courts to 
dissociate itself by excluding the evidence. 
‣ Were there any extenuating  circumstances that 
may attenuate the breach such as preserving 
evidence or good faith?  Or were the police 
ignorant of Charter standards or act wilfully, or 
flagrantly? Deliberate Charter misconduct or 
conduct that is part of a pattern of abuse tends 
to support exclusion of evidence.
4. Impact of the Charter-Protected Interests 
of the Accused
‣ What right was infringed and how did it impact 
the accused? For example, a statement 
obtained by police can breach the s.7 right to 
silence stemming  from the principle against 
self incrimination. The more serious the impact 
on the accused’s Charter-protected interests, 
the greater the risk of exclusion. 
5. Society’s Interest in an Adjudication on the 
Merits
‣ Would the truth seeking  function of a criminal 
trial be better served by admitting  or excluding 
the evidence, balanced against the integrity of 
the justice system? Considerations in this line 
of inquiry include the reliability of the 
evidence and the importance of the evidence 
to the prosecutions case.
Types of Evidence
 
The Court also looked at four types of evidence 
(statements, bodily evidence, non-bodily physical 
evidence, and derivative evidence) and discussed 
how their revised approach could treat these types of 
evidence (see Evidence Admission/Exclusion Grid)
In this case the Supreme Court held the gun, which 
was classified as derivative evidence since it was 
discovered as a result of statements taken in breach of 
the Charter (ss. 9 and 10(b)), was admissible using  its 
revised approach because its admission, on balance, 
would not bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute:
SIDEBAR
Another issue the Supreme Court had to decide in the Grant 
case was whether the word “transfer” found in ss. 84, 99, and 
100 of the Criminal Code meant simply to transport. In this 
case, the accused was convicted of possessing a firearm for the 
purpose of weapons trafficking (s.100(1)). A majority of the 
Ontario  Court of Appeal found the word transfer for the 
purposes of the trafficking section meant to carry, convey or 
remove from one place to another. Because the accused had 
admitted that he was “dropping off” the gun somewhere up 
the road, he was moving it from one place to  another and 
therefore transferring it. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the simple movement of a 
firearm from one place to  another was not transferring it for 
the purposes of the section.  A more restrictive meaning for 
transfer, other than to simply transport, was required because:
• the common element of the definition of transfer, such as 
sell, provide, barter, give, lend, rent, sent, transport, ship, 
distribute or deliver is a transaction;  
• the words “whether or not for consideration” that 
accompany the transferring suggests Parliament did not 
want to criminalize the simple movement of firearms, again 
suggesting transfer is transactional in nature; 
• there are other provisions that deal with “transfers” falling 
short of trafficking; and
• s.100 in the Criminal Code is deemed to be a trafficking 
offence which now carries a mandatory three year prison 
sentence for a first time conviction. Parliament did not 
intend anyone moving a firearm from place to place 
without authorization to be a weapons trafficker liable to 
this minimum sentence.
The conviction on the firearm charge related to  this issue was 
overturned and an acquittal was entered.
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1. seriousness of police conduct
‣ the police were not abusive;
‣ the accused was not the 
target of racial profiling or 
other discriminatory 
practices;
‣ the point at which an 
encounter becomes a 
detention is not always clear;
‣ the accused’s detention was an understandable 
mistake;
‣ the error in not providing s.10(b) was 
understandable since the police mistakenly 
believed the accused was not detained;
‣ the police did not act in bad faith;
‣ the breach was not deliberate or egregious.
2. impact of breach on the accused
‣ s.9 breach 
- deprived the accused of 
his liberty interests;
- detention did not 
involve physical 
coercion nor was it 
abusive;
- impact of breach not 
severe but more than minimal.
‣ s.10(b) breach
- accused’s incriminating statements were 
prompted directly from pointed questioning;
- the accused was in need of legal advice but 
was not told he could call a lawyer;
- the evidence was non-discoverable. Police 
said they would not have searched the 
accused absent his self-incriminatory 
statements nor did they have the grounds to 
do so. 
3. society’s interest
‣ the value of the evidence 
was considerable;
‣ the gun was highly reliable 
evidence;
‣ the gun was essential to the 
Crown’s case.
As a result of the revised s.24(2) analysis, the gun was 
admitted as evidence and the convictions were 
upheld, save the possession of a firearm charge for 
the purpose of unlawfully transferring  it (see SIDEBAR 
discussion on page 29). 
A Pair in Partial (Dis)agreement
Two justices disagreed with the majority in some 
respects, while agreeing  in others. Justice Binnie 
agreed the accused was arbitrarily detained, with the 
majority’s revised s.24(2) framework, and that the 
evidence was admissible, but differed on the 
approach to defining  detention. In his view, the test 
proposed by the majority was strictly an objective 
assessment divorced from the perception of the 
parties involved. He opined that that the perceptions 
of the police could be significant in the analysis, such 
as why they initiated the encounter: 
It is not controversial that in  the early stages of a 
criminal investigation the police must be afforded 
some flexibility before the lawyers get involved.  The 
police do have the right to ask questions and they 
need to seek the co-operation of members of the 
public, including  those who turn out to be 
miscreants.  ... In my view ... a better and broader 
approach to detention would explicitly take into 
account (i) the objective facts of such encounters, 
whether or not evident to the person stopped, as 
well as (ii) the perception of the police in initiating 
the encounter, whether or not evident to the person 
stopped, and (iii) whatever information the police 
possess at the time, which may or may not be 
known to the person stopped, as well as whatever 
change in the police perception occurs as the 
encounter develops.   These matters should all be 
factored into a more comprehensive analysis of 
when a “detention” occurs for Charter purposes 
than is provided in the ... claimant-centred 
approach affirmed today by the Court. [para. 180]
Justice Deschamps also agreed that the accused was 
arbitrarily detained and that the evidence was 
admissible. She noted the officers were calm and 
polite and the detention was most likely not 
intentional. She suggested that if the police “do not 
really intend to detain a person, they should - by their 
deeds and their words - let the person know that he 
or she is not being  singled out.” But she disagreed 
with the majority’s s.24(2) framework. In her view, 
there were only two aspects to consider in the 24(2) 
analysis: (1) the public interest in protecting  Charter 
rights and the public interest in an adjudication of a 
case on its merits.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
weighs in 
favour of 
admission
weighs in 
favour of 
exclusion
weighs in 
favour of 
admission
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EVIDENCE ADMISSION/EXCLUSION GRID
Evidence 
Type
Statements Bodily 
Evidence
Non-Bodily Physical 
Evidence
Derivative 
Evidence
Considerations • statements engage 
the principle against 
self incrimination, a 
cornerstone of 
criminal law, from 
which a number of 
common law & 
Charter rules 
emanate including 
the confessions rule, 
the rights to silence 
(s.7), counsel (s.
10(b)), non-
compellability (s.
11(c), and use 
immunity (s.13).
• presumptive, but 
not automatic, 
exclusion
• evidence taken from the 
body of the accused, such 
as DNA or breath samples
• plucking a hair from a 
suspect’s head may not be 
intrusive & privacy interest 
may be relatively slight 
whereas a body cavity or 
strip search may be 
intrusive, demeaning & 
objectionable
• where intrusion on bodily 
integrity is deliberate and 
impact on accused’s 
privacy, bodily integrity & 
dignity is high, evidence 
will generally be excluded  
even though relevant and 
reliable
• eg. drugs, gun 
• see for example R. v. 
Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 
(at p. 33)
• refers to physical 
evidence discovered as a 
result of an unlawfully 
obtained statement
Seriousness of the 
Charter-Infringing 
State Conduct  
(admission may 
send the message that 
the justice system 
condones serious 
state misconduct)
• examine police 
conduct in 
obtaining statements 
• public confidence 
requires police 
adhere to Charter 
when obtaining 
statements
• serious breaches 
more harmful than 
minor or inadvertent 
slips
• admission of evidence 
obtained by deliberate & 
egregious conduct may 
undermine respect for the 
court process
• admission of evidence 
obtained in good faith 
may have little adverse 
effect on court process
• admission of evidence 
obtained by deliberate 
& egregious conduct 
may undermine respect 
for the court process
• admission of evidence 
obtained in good faith 
may have little adverse 
effect on court process
• the more serious the state 
conduct in obtaining the 
statement that lead to the 
physical evidence the 
more its admission may 
undermine respect for the 
court process
• Did the police 
deliberately & 
systematically flout 
Charter rights or did they 
act in good faith?
Impact of the 
Breach on the 
Charter-Protected 
Interests of the 
Accused 
(admission may 
send the message that 
individual rights 
count for little)
• eg. s.10(b) breach 
undermines right to 
silence & protection 
against testimonial 
self incrimination
• favours exclusion
• the greater the intrusion 
on the accused’s protected 
interests the more 
important to exclude
• seriousness of intrusions 
vary greatly, from 
fingerprinting and iris-
recognition technology on 
one end to forcibly taking 
blood samples or dental 
impressions on the other
• usually engages s.8 of 
the Charter
• eg. dwelling house 
attracts a higher 
expectation of privacy 
than a business or 
automobile therefore a 
home search will be 
viewed as more serious
• an unjustified strip 
search or body cavity 
search is extremely 
serious
• where statement is 
unconstitutionally 
obtained (usually through 
s.10(b) breach linked to 
making an informed 
choice about whether to 
talk) & accused’s 
protected interest 
significantly 
compromised, exclusion 
strongly favoured
• discoverability an 
important factor 
strengthening or 
attenuating breach
• if independently 
discoverable, impact 
reduced and admission 
more likely
Society’s Interest in 
the Adjudication of 
the Case on its 
Merits
(truth finding v. 
integrity of the justice 
system)
• Charter tainted 
statements may be 
unreliable, thereby 
undercutting the 
necessity of the 
statement for a trial 
on its merits
• usually favours admission 
because it is generally 
reliable evidence 
• reliability issues with 
physical evidence not 
generally related to 
Charter breach & 
weighs in favour of 
admission
• since evidence is physical 
there is less concern with 
reliability which favours 
admission
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HATE CRIMES DROP
In May 2009 Statistics Canada released a report 
entitled “Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 
2007”.  Highlights of the report include:
• There was a 13% decrease in hate crimes. In 2007 
there were 785 crimes motivated by hatred 
towards a particular group, down from 892 crimes 
reported in 2006.
• About half of all police-reported hate crimes were 
mischief offences such as graffiti on public 
property. Three in ten hate crimes involved 
violence. Only one homicide was reportedly 
motivated by hate in 2007.
• The most common motivation for hate crime was 
race or ethnicity (62%), followed by religion 
(23%) and sexual orientation (10%). 
• Among  racially-motivated hate crimes, Blacks 
were the most targeted (33%), followed by East 
and Southeast Asian (12%), South Asian (11%), 
Caucasian (10%), Arab or West Asian (6%) and 
Aboriginal (3%). 
• Among  religious-motivated hate crimes, Jewish 
was the most targeted (69%), followed by Muslim 
(Islam) (16%), and Catholic (8%). 
• Youths accounted for a disproportionate number 
of accused persons. In 2007, 32% of persons 
accused of hate crime were youth, which was 
almost twice the percentage of youth accused of 
crime in general (17%).
TOP 10 HATE CRIMES RATES
CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREAS
CMA Rate per 100,000
Calgary, AB 8.0
Edmonton, AB 6.2
Saint John, NB 6.2
Hamilton, ON 6.0
Ottawa, ON 6.0
London, ON 5.9
Toronto, ON 5.0
Kingston, ON 4.6
Abbotsford, BC 3.5
Vancouver, BC 3.5
What is hate crime?
“Hate crimes refer to criminal offences that are 
motivated by hatred towards an identifiable 
group. The incident may target:
 race,
 national or ethnic origin,
 language,
 colour,
 religion,
 sex,
 age,
 mental or physical disability, 
 sexual orientation or
 other factors such as occupation or political    
      beliefs.”
Source:  Statistics Canada, 2009, “Police-reported hate 
crime in Canada, 2007”, catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 
29, no. 2 at page 6.
Top 3 Hate Crime Motivations
 Race or ethnicity                 62%
 Religion                               23%
 Sexual orientation                10%
Source:  Statistics Canada, 2009, “Police-reported 
hate crime in Canada, 2007”, catalogue no. 
85-002-X, Vol. 29, no. 2 at page 15.
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STOP & SEARCH A BLATANT 
DISREGARD FOR CHARTER 
RIGHTS: EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34
A police officer saw a Dodge 
Durango without a front licence plate 
(an offence for Ontario registered 
vehicles) and decided to stop it. 
When he activated his emergency 
lights and manoeuvred in behind the vehicle he 
noticed it had an Alberta rear licence plate and 
realized the vehicle did not require a front plate. He 
nonetheless decided not to abandon his intention to 
stop the vehicle because he wanted to maintain his 
“integrity” in the eyes of observers—he already had 
his emergency lights on and had begun the stop. 
There were two men in the vehicle. The officer asked 
the accused for his licence and vehicle registration, 
insurance and rental agreement. The accused looked 
for but was unable to produce his licence. During  the 
encounter the officer noted the vehicle looked lived 
in—it was messy and littered with used food and 
drink containers—and there was clothing  and bags 
on the back seat and two boxes in the rear 
compartment. Both occupants provided different 
versions of their association. After conducting 
computer checks, the officer learned the accused’s 
drivers licence had been suspended and he was 
arrested for that offence.  
The officer decided to search the vehicle as an 
incident to the arrest because the accused hadn’t 
“identified himself properly” and the officer believed 
the accused’s driver’s licence could be within the 
vehicle. For safety reasons the officer asked the 
occupants if there were drugs or weapons inside the 
vehicle. He didn’t want to get pricked by a needle or 
pull a trigger on a handgun 
when searching. His suspicions 
were also aroused that there 
cou ld poss ib ly be d rugs , 
weapons, cash or a combination 
thereof inside the vehicle. He 
based this on his training  and 
experience, including  a Drug 
Interdiction Course,  Both men 
responded in the negative to the 
officer’s questions about the presence of drugs or 
weapons. The officer searched the rental vehicle 
anyways and found 77 pounds (35 kgs.) of cocaine 
with a street value of between $2,463,000 and 
$4,575,000 in the two boxes located in the rear area. 
The men were arrested for possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on a 
charge of trafficking, the accused argued his Charter 
rights were breached and he sought to have the 
evidence excluded. The trial judge found the officer 
breached ss.8 and 9 of the Charter. He held the men 
were arbitrarily detained and that the search of the 
vehicle was unreasonable.  In his view, the officer did 
not have reasonable grounds to stop and search the 
car and knew it. He found that the officer’s 
explanation for stopping  the vehicle and detaining  its 
occupants was contrived and defied credibility.  The 
search of the vehicle after arrest was not “truly 
incidental” to the arrest for driving  while under 
suspension and the officer’s stated purpose for the 
search was certainly not reasonable. The officer’s 
actions were flagrant, brazen, not committed in good 
faith, and the Charter breaches were extremely 
serious. However, the judge refused to exclude the 
cocaine under s.24(2) because trial fairness was not 
compromised and the Charter breaches “pale in 
comparison to the criminality involved in the 
possession for the purposes of distribution of 77 
pounds of cocaine...” The accused was convicted and 
sentenced to five years in prison.
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was dismissed by a divided panel. Two judges upheld 
the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence, 
although concluding  it was a close call. They 
acknowledged that the Charter breaches were 
serious, but found they were mitigated somewhat. 
The officer did not have “a 
carefully thought out plan or 
practice to breach the Charter” 
and the violations were not 
“de l ibera te” .  Rather, the 
inexperienced officer made a 
serious mistake - it was a 
f l aw e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
process, not a systemic or 
institutional pattern of abuse, 
“While an officer’s ‘hunch’ is a 
valuable investigative tool – 
indeed, here it proved highly 
accurate – it is no substitute for 
proper Charter standards when 
interfering with a suspect’s liberty.” 
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that lead to the breaches. As well, the detention was 
brief, not physically coercive and the accused’s 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the vehicle 
was not great - compared to a person’s body, home, 
or office. Further, the accused denied that the boxes 
containing  the cocaine belonged to him, further 
mitigating  any privacy violation. Thus, the effects of 
the Charter breaches on the accused were relatively 
minor. In the dissenting  judge’s view, the breaches 
were intentional violations that undermined the 
integrity of the administration of justice and 
condoning  the constitutional misconduct by 
admitting  the evidence obtained would do more 
harm to the integrity of the justice system than would 
excluding  evidence. She would have allowed the 
appeal and entered an acquittal.
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada which, using  the revised s.24(2) Charter 
analysis developed in R. v. Grant (see p. 22), would 
have excluded the evidence by a 6:1 majority. In this 
case, the accused’s rights under ss. 8  and 9 of the 
Charter were violated by the detention and search. 
The officer should not have made the initial stop 
because he knew that the accused’s vehicle did not 
require a front licence plate before pulling  it over. “A 
vague concern for the ‘integrity’ of the police, even if 
genuine, was clearly an inadequate reason to follow 
through with the detention,” said the majority. “The 
subsequent search of the S.U.V. was not incidental to 
the [accused’s] arrest for driving  under a suspension 
and was likewise in breach of the Charter. While an 
officer’s “hunch” is a valuable investigative tool – 
indeed, here it proved highly accurate – it is no 
substitute for proper Charter standards when 
interfering with a suspect’s liberty.”
The Court then went on to determine whether the 
evidence was admissible under their revised s.24(2) 
approach using the following three lines of inquiry:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter‑infringing  state 
conduct. 
Did it involve misconduct from which the court 
should be concerned to dissociate itself? This 
will be the case where the departure from 
Charter standards was major in degree, or 
where the police knew (or should have known) 
that their conduct was not Charter-compliant. 
On the other hand, where the breach was of a 
merely technical nature or the result of an 
understandable mistake,  dissociation is much 
less of a concern. [para. 22]
‣ the breaches were serious and represented a 
reckless and blatant disregard for Charter 
rights;
‣ reasonable grounds for the 
initial stop was entirely 
non-existent; 
‣ reasonable grounds for 
the search were also 
non-existent;
‣ the o f f icer ’s in cour t 
testimony was misleading. 
(2) the impact of the breach  on the Charter‑ 
protected interests of the accused.
This factor looks at the seriousness of the 
infringement from the perspective of the 
accused. Did the breach seriously compromise 
the  interests  underlying the right(s) infringed?  
Or was the breach merely transient or trivial in 
its impact? These are among the questions that 
fall for consideration  in this inquiry. [para. 28]
‣ the detention was intended to brief and there 
was a lower expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle:
[M]otorists have a lower expectation of 
privacy in their vehicles than they do in 
their homes. As participants in a highly 
regulated activity, they know that they may 
be stopped for reasons pertaining to 
highway safety —  as in a drinking-and-
driving  roadblock, for instance. Had it not 
turned up incriminating   e v i d e n c e , t h e 
detention would have been brief. In these 
respects, the intrusion on liberty and privacy 
represented by the detention is less severe 
than it would be in the case of a pedestrian. 
Further, nothing in the encounter was 
demeaning  to the dignity of the [accused]. 
[para. 30]
‣ but, being  stopped and searched without 
lawful justification is much more than trivial;
weighs in 
favour of 
exclusion
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‣ t h e a c c u s e d h a d t h e 
expectation to be left 
alone, absent a valid 
highway traffic stop;
‣ although not egregious, 
the deprivation of the 
accused’s liberty and privacy 
was significant.
3. society's interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits.  
At this stage, the court considers factors such as 
the reliability of the evidence and its 
importance to the Crown’s case. [para. 33]
‣ the drugs were highly 
reliable evidence;
‣ the drugs were critical to 
the Crown’s case;
‣ the charge was very 
serious.
In concluding  the evidence was inadmissible and that 
“the price paid by society for an acquittal in these 
circumstances is outweighed by the importance of 
maintaining Charter standards” the Court stated:
The balancing exercise mandated by s. 24(2) is a 
qualitative one, not capable of mathematical 
precision. It is not simply a question of whether 
the majority of the relevant factors favour 
exclusion in a particular case.  The evidence on 
each  line of inquiry must be weighed in the 
balance, to determine whether, having  regard to 
all the circumstances, admission of the evidence 
would bring  the administration of justice into 
disrepute. Dissociation of the justice system from 
police misconduct does not always trump the 
truth‑seeking  interests of the criminal justice 
system. Nor is the converse true.  In all cases, it is 
the long-term repute of the administration of 
justice that must be assessed. [para. 36]
And further:      
... The police misconduct was serious; indeed, the 
trial judge found that it represented a “brazen and 
flagrant” disregard of the Charter.   To appear to 
condone wilful and flagrant Charter breaches that 
constituted a significant incursion on the 
appellant’s rights does not enhance the long-term 
repute of the administration of justice; on the 
contrary, it undermines it.  In this case, the 
seriousness of the offence and the reliability of 
the evidence, while important, do not outweigh 
the factors pointing to exclusion. 
 
... [A]llowing the seriousness of the offence and 
the reliability of the evidence to overwhelm the s. 
24(2) analysis “would deprive those charged with 
serious crimes of the protection of the individual 
freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the 
Charter and, in effect, declare that in the 
administration of 
the criminal law 
‘the ends justify the 
means’”....  Charter 
protections must be 
construed so as to 
apply to everyone, 
even those alleged 
to have committed the most serious criminal 
offences. ... [T]he trial judge seemed to imply that 
where the evidence is reliable and the charge is 
serious, admission will always be the result. ... 
[T]his is not the law.
 
Additionally, the trial judge’s observation that the 
Charter breaches “pale in comparison to the 
criminality involved” in drug trafficking  risked the 
appearance of turning  the s. 24(2) inquiry into a 
contest between the misdeeds of the police and 
those of the accused.  The fact that a Charter 
breach is less heinous than the offence charged 
does not advance the inquiry mandated by s. 
24(2).  We expect police to adhere to higher 
standards than alleged criminals. [paras. 39-41]
The evidence was excluded and an acquittal was 
entered. 
A Lone Dissenter
Justice Deschamps disagreed with her colleagues and 
would have admitted the evidence.  In her view, “the 
public interest in an adjudication on the merits is 
paramount, and this is a case in which excluding  the 
evidence will have a negative effect on the 
confidence of an objective person, fully informed of 
all the circumstances, in the administration of 
justice.”
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
weighs in 
favour of 
exclusion
weighs in 
favour of 
admission
“We expect police 
to adhere to higher 
standards than 
alleged criminals.” 
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INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
TRIGGERS s.10(b) RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL
R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33 
Police were called to a Liquor Control 
Board of Ontario (LCBO) store where 
a man was attempting  to purchase a 
$3 bottle of beer using  a $100 LCBO 
gift certificate obtained earlier that 
day in another town using  a stolen credit card. An 
employee tried to stall the man until police arrived. 
As police arrived one officer spoke to the other man 
while a second officer approached the accused as he 
walked towards the exit. The accused said, “He did 
this, not me, so I guess I can go.” The officer followed 
him out of the store and as the accused was getting 
into the driver’s seat of a minivan said, “Wait a 
minute. I need to talk to you before you go 
anywhere.” The officer then had a brief conversation 
with the accused where a series of questions were 
asked, including  where he was from, who the male 
inside the store was, and who owned the van. At the 
time however, the accused was not advised of his 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter. 
The officer was then advised by police radio that two 
suspects had purchased the gift certificates using  a 
stolen credit card. A vehicle description and licence 
plate number was also provided which matched the 
accused’s vehicle. The officer asked the accused for 
identification and vehicle ownership papers. While 
the accused retrieved the documents the officer saw 
an LCBO bag  containing  liquor, Wal-Mart bags, and 
several boxes with new merchandise behind the front 
seat. At this point the accused was arrested for fraud, 
but interrupted the officer by protesting  his 
innocence. The van was subsequently searched and 
police found a black purse with information 
pertaining  to the owner of the stolen credit and debit 
cards. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the officer 
detaining  the accused said he did so because he was 
not sure whether the accused was involved in the 
incident nor the extent of his involvement if he was. 
The officer explained his purpose for questioning  was 
to look into what was going  on. The trial judge 
concluded that the circumstances of this case 
involved a “momentary investigative detention” and 
the officer’s questions were merely preliminary or 
exploratory to determine if their was any involvement 
by the accused. The trial judge determined that the 
accused’s right to counsel under s.10(b) was not 
triggered until a few minutes into the encounter when 
the officer determined the accused was involved in 
the incident and that he could not let him go - a point 
that happened to coincide with arrest. There was no 
Charter breach and the accused was convicted of 
possession of a credit card obtained by crime and 
two counts of possession of property obtained by 
crime under $5,000. He was sentenced to 90 days in 
jail and placed on probation for a year. 
The accused’s appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice was dismissed. The Superior Court Justice 
found s.10(b) was not engaged by an investigative 
detention. On further appeal to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, the unanimous panel found the accused had 
been detained at the outset of the encounter with the 
officer. However, the Court interpreted the words 
“without delay” found in s.10(b) allowed for a brief 
interlude between the beginning  of an investigative 
detention and advising  the detainee of their  right to 
counsel. It is during  this time that the police may ask 
exploratory questions to determine whether more 
than a brief detention is necessary. Since the officer 
did inform the accused of his right to counsel without 
delay - taking  into account the permissible interlude - 
s.10(b) was not violated. The accused’s appeal was 
therefore dismissed. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada which had to determine whether the accused 
was detained, and if so, how s.10(b) applied to the 
circumstances.
Was there a Detention?
The accused argued that he was detained sometime 
prior to his arrest. He submitted that the conduct of 
the officer during  the initial part of the encounter 
effectively detained him and thereby triggered his 
right to counsel under s.10(b).   
In R. v. Grant, the Supreme Court “adopted a 
purposive approach to the definition of ‘detention’ 
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and held that a ‘detention’ for 
the purposes of the Charter 
refers to a suspension of an 
individual’s liberty interest by 
virtue of a significant physical or 
psychological restraint at the 
hands of the state.” Because 
a detention can manifest in both 
physical and psychological 
forms, “police actions short of 
holding  an individual behind 
bars or in handcuffs can be 
coercive enough to engage the 
rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 
of the Charter.” But not every 
encounter with police will be a 
detention:
... [N]ot every interaction 
between the pol ice and 
members of the public, even 
for investigative purposes, 
constitutes a detention within the meaning of the 
Charter. Section 9 of the Charter does not dictate 
that police abstain from interacting with members 
of the public until they have specific grounds to 
connect the individual to the commission of a 
crime. Likewise, not every police encounter, even 
with a suspect, will trigger an individual’s right to 
counsel under s. 10(b). ... 
...[I]t is clear that an individual may be detained 
within the meaning of the Charter without being 
subject to actual physical restraint.  Where the 
subject is legally required to comply with a  
demand or direction that interferes with his or her 
liberty, detention is usually easily made out.  
Where there is no legal obligation to comply but 
a reasonable person in the subject’s position 
would conclude that he or she had been deprived 
of the liberty of choice, a detention is also 
established.
Even when an encounter clearly 
results in a detention, for example 
when the person is ultimately 
arrested and taken in police custody, 
it cannot simply be assumed that 
there was a detention from the 
beginning  of the interaction.  Given 
the immediacy of the s. 10(b) 
obligation to inform a 
detainee of his or her right 
to counsel, it is important 
to determine if and when 
an encounter between the 
police and an individual 
effectively crystallizes in a 
detention. It will depend 
on the circumstances. It is 
f o r t h e t r i a l j u d g e , 
applying the proper legal 
principles to the particular 
facts of the case, to 
determine whether the 
line has been crossed. 
[paras. 3-5]
And further:
While a detention is 
clearly indicated by the 
existence of physical 
r e s t r a i n t o r a l e g a l 
obligation to comply with a police demand, a 
detention can also be grounded when  police 
conduct would cause a reasonable person to 
conclude that he or she no longer had the 
freedom to choose whether or not to cooperate 
with the police.  ... [T]his is an objective 
determination, made in light of the circumstances 
of an encounter as a whole.
However, this latter understanding of detention 
does not mean that every interaction with the 
police will amount to a detention for the 
purposes of the Charter, even when a person is 
under investigation for criminal activity, is asked 
questions, or is physically delayed by contact 
with the police.  ...  
... [T]he meaning  of “detention” can only be 
determined by adopting a purposive approach 
that neither overshoots nor impoverishes the 
protection intended by 
the Charter right in 
question.  It necessitates 
s t r i k i n g  a b a l a n c e 
b e t w e e n s o c i e t y ’s 
interest in effective 
p o l i c i n g  a n d t h e 
detainee’s interest in 
robust Charter rights. To 
simply assume that a 
“Where there is no legal obligation 
to comply but a reasonable person 
in the subject’s position would 
conclude that he or she had been 
deprived of the liberty of choice, a 
detention is also established.” 
“[N]ot every interaction between the 
police and members of the public, 
even for investigative purposes, 
constitutes a detention within the 
meaning of the Charter. Section 9 of 
the Charter does not dictate that 
police abstain from interacting with 
members of the public until they have 
specific grounds to connect the 
individual to the commission of a 
crime. Likewise, not every police 
encounter, even with a suspect, will 
trigger an individual’s right to counsel 
under s. 10(b).” 
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detention occurs every 
time a person is delayed 
from going on his or her 
way because of the 
police accosting him or 
her during  the course of 
an investigation, without 
considering whether or 
no t the in te rac t ion 
involved a significant 
deprivation of liberty 
would overshoot the 
purpose of the Charter. 
[paras. 22-24] 
In this case the obvious markers of 
detention were not present. The 
accused was not physically 
restrained prior to his arrest nor 
would he have been subject to 
legal sanction for refusing  to 
comply with the officer’s request 
that he “wait”.  But would “the 
officer’s conduct in the context of 
the encounter as a whole would 
cause a reasonable person in the 
same situation to conclude that he 
or she was not free to go and that 
he or she had to comply with the 
officer’s request”?  On this point 
the Supreme Court stated:
...[I]n a situation where the police believe a crime 
has recently been committed, the police may 
engage in preliminary questioning of bystanders 
without giving rise to a detention under ss. 9 and 
10 of the Charter.  Despite a police request for 
information or 
a s s i s t a n c e , a 
b y s t a n d e r i s 
under no legal 
o b l i g a t i o n t o 
c o m p l y.  Th i s 
legal proposition 
must inform the 
perspective of 
the reasonable 
person in the 
circumstances of 
the person being 
questioned.  The 
onus is on the applicant to 
show that in the circumstances 
he or she was effectively 
deprived of his or her liberty of 
choice.  The test is an objective 
one and the failure of the 
applicant to testify as to his or 
h e r p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e 
encounter is not fatal to the 
application.  However, the 
applicant’s   contention that the 
police by their conduct effected 
a significant deprivation of his 
or her liberty must find support 
in the evidence.
The l ine be tween genera l 
que s t i on ing and focus sed 
interrogation amounting to 
detention may be difficult to draw 
in particular cases. It is the task of 
the trial judge on a Charter 
app l i c a t i on t o a s s e s s t he 
circumstances and determine 
whether the line between general 
questioning  and detention has 
been crossed.  [The trial judge’s] 
findings on the facts, supported 
by the evidence, lead to the view 
that a reasonable person in the 
c i rcumstances would have 
concluded that the initial encounter was 
preliminary investigative questioning  falling short 
of detention. [paras. 28-29]  
Using  the three factors of assessing  a psychological 
detention absent a legal obligation to comply, the 
Supreme Court held the trial judge’s findings 
supported the view that the accused was not under 
detention:
• circumstances of the encounter
‣ the initial part of the encounter was of a 
preliminary or exploratory nature;
‣ the officer was engaged in a general inquiry;
‣ the officer had not yet zeroed in on the 
accused as someone whose movements 
must be controlled;
‣ a possible crime had just occurred and the 
police had arrived to investigate;
“[I]n a situation where the police 
believe a crime has recently been 
committed, the police may engage in 
preliminary questioning of bystanders 
without giving rise to a detention under 
ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter. Despite a 
police request for information or 
assistance, a bystander is under no 
legal obligation to comply.” 
“Even when an encounter 
clearly results in a detention, 
for example when the person 
is ultimately arrested and 
taken in police custody, it 
cannot simply be assumed 
that there was a detention 
from the beginning of the 
interaction. ” 
“[I]n a situation where the 
police believe a crime has 
recently been committed, 
the police may engage in 
preliminary questioning of 
bystanders without giving 
rise to a detention under 
ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter. ” 
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‣ the officer engaged the accused in an 
attempt to orient himself to the unfolding 
situation:  
[I]t would be absurd to suggest that [the 
officer] should give everyone present their 
right to counsel before proceeding to sort 
out the situation. ... [I]t would also be 
unreasonable to require that the right to 
counsel be given the moment the police 
approach any suspect in the process of 
sor t ing  out the s i tuat ion.  In the 
circumstances here, one man appeared to 
be involved in the matter under 
investigation and another, [the accused], 
had attracted attention.  [The officer] was 
engaging him to determine... ’if there was 
any involvement by this person’.   ... [I]t 
occurred to [the officer] that this man 
might be involved. However ... he did not 
at that time believe he had sufficient 
information to act on his suspicion by 
detaining [the accused].  It was only after 
he received additional information over 
the radio linking  the [accused], the van, 
and the contents of the van to an offence 
that he believed the [accused] was 
involved in a criminal act such that he 
could not allow the [accused] to leave the 
scene.  As a whole, the circumstances of 
the encounter support a reasonable 
perception that [the officer] was orienting 
himself to the situation rather than 
intending  to deprive [the accused] of his 
liberty.  Further, [the accused] did not 
testify or call evidence on that matter.  In 
summary, the circumstances ... do not 
suggest detention. [para. 32]
• conduct of the police 
‣ Did the police conduct, taken as a whole, 
support a reasonable conclusion that the 
accused had no choice but to comply?
‣ Although the officer said, “Wait a minute, I 
need to talk to you before you do 
anywhere,” he did not obstruct the 
accused’s movement but rather simply 
spoke to him as he sat in his van;
‣ the encounter was “a very brief dialogue”;
‣ the conduct of the officer viewed 
objectively supported the view that only 
preliminary questioning  was occurring  to 
find out whether to proceed further. 
• characteristics of the individual
‣ Would a reasonable person in the 
circumstances have concluded by reason of 
the state conduct that he or she had no 
choice but to comply? 
 
...[T]he fact that a person is delayed by the 
police is insufficient to ground a 
reasonable conclusion that he or she was 
not free to go, or that he or she was bound 
to comply with the officer’s request for 
information. [The accused] did not testify 
on the application, and there was no 
evidence as to whether he subjectively 
believed that he could not leave. Nor was 
t h e r e e v i d e n c e o f h i s p e r s o n a l 
circumstances, feelings or knowledge. The 
only evidence came from [the officer] ... 
that he was merely “exploring the 
situation”.  The Officer testified that [the 
accused] never told him that he did not 
wish to speak with him, and that the 
conversation  was not “strained”. [para. 
34]
As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
accused was not detained prior to his arrest.  
Was s.10(b) Triggered?
Although “[t]here was no right to counsel because 
there was no detention,” the Supreme Court felt it 
necessary to decide “whether the right to retain and 
instruct counsel ‘without delay’ means that these 
duties must be executed immediately at the outset of 
a detention, or whether these duties manifest at some 
later point subsequent to the start of a detention.” 
Section 10(b) protects the right of a person in 
detention or under arrest to obtain legal counsel. It 
reads: 
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention...(b) 
to retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
to be informed of that right; ...
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In describing  the rights 
af forded by s .10(b) the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Once engaged, s.10(b) 
imposes both informational 
and implementational duties on the police.  The 
informational duty requires that the detainee be 
informed of the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay.  The implementational 
obligation   imposed on the police under s. 10(b), 
requires the police to provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct 
counsel. This obligation also requires the police 
to refrain from eliciting incriminatory evidence 
from the detainee until he or she has had a 
reasonable opportunity to reach a lawyer, or the 
detainee has unequivocally waived the right to do 
so. [para. 38]
The Court then went on to hold that if there is a 
detention, the police must inform an individual of a 
right to counsel immediately upon detention, even 
short investigatory ones:
... The concerns regarding compelled self-
incrimination and the interference with liberty 
that s.10(b) seeks to address are present as soon 
as a detention is effected. Therefore, from the 
moment an individual is detained, s. 10(b) is 
engaged and, as the words of the provision 
dictate, the police have the obligation to inform 
the detainee of his or her right to counsel 
“without delay”. The immediacy of this obligation 
is only subject to concerns for 
officer or public safety, or to 
reasonable limitations that are 
prescribed by law and justified 
under s. 1 of the Charter. 
[para. 2]
And further:
... [T]he purpose of s.10(b) is 
to ensure that individuals 
know of their right to counsel, 
and have access to it, in 
situations where they suffer a 
significant deprivation of 
liberty due to state coercion 
which leaves them vulnerable 
to the exercise of state power 
and in a position of legal jeopardy.  Specifically, 
the right to counsel is meant to assist detainees 
regain their liberty, and guard against the risk of 
involuntary self-incrimination.
A situation of vulnerability relative to the state 
is created at the outset of a detention. Thus, the 
concerns about self-incrimination and the 
interference with liberty that s.10(b) seeks to 
address are present as soon as a detention is 
effected.  In order to protect against the risk of 
self-incrimination that results from the individuals 
being deprived of their liberty by the state, and in 
order to assist them in regaining their liberty, it is 
only logical that the phrase “without delay” must 
be interpreted as “immediately”.  If the s. 10(b) 
right to counsel is to serve its intended purpose to 
mitigate the legal disadvantage and legal 
jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in 
regaining  their  l iberty, the police must 
immediately inform them of the right to counsel 
as soon as the detention arises.
To allow for a delay between the outset of a 
detention and the engagement of the police 
duties under s. 10(b) creates an ill‑defined and 
unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(b) 
right.  The right to counsel requires a stable and 
predictable definition.  What constitutes a 
permissible delay is abstract and difficult to 
quantify, whereas the concept of immediacy 
leaves little room for misunderstanding.  An 
ill‑defined threshold for the application of the 
right to counsel must be avoided, particularly as it 
relates to a right that imposes specific obligations 
on the police. In our view, the 
words “without delay” mean 
“ i m m e d i a t e l y ” f o r t h e 
purposes of s.10(b).   Subject 
to concerns for officer or 
public safety, and such 
limitations as prescribed by 
law and justified under s.1 of 
the Charter, the police have a 
duty to inform a detainee of 
his or her right to retain and 
instruct counsel, and a duty 
t o f a c i l i t a t e t h a t r i g h t 
immediately upon detention. 
[paras. 40-42]
“There was no right to 
counsel because there 
was no detention.” 
“[T]he words ‘without delay’ mean 
‘immediately’ for the purposes of 
s. 10(b).  Subject to concerns for 
officer or public safety, and such 
limitations as prescribed by law and 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter, 
the police have a duty to inform a 
detainee of his or her right to 
retain and instruct counsel, and a 
duty to facilitate that right 
immediately upon detention.” 
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The Crown’s contention that the police could suspend 
the right to counsel in the course of short 
investigatory detentions as a reasonable limit under 
s.1 of the Charter was rejected. There are 
circumstances where the police pull over a driver and 
give a demand for sobriety tests without providing   s.
10(b) rights. But that breach is saved under s. 1. The 
Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded that 
there should be a general suspension of the s.10(b) 
right to counsel for investigatory purposes, with or 
without some form of use immunity such that 
incriminating  evidence gathered prior to informing  an 
individual of his s.10(b) right would be inadmissible. 
“Because the definition of detention ... gives the 
police leeway to engage members of the public in 
non-coercive, exploratory questioning  without 
necessarily triggering  their Charter rights relating  to 
detention,” said the Court, “s.1 need not be invoked 
in order to allow the police to effectively fulfill their 
investigative duties.”
The majority would have rejected the accused’s 
appeal and upheld the convictions.
A Second View By Two
Although Justice Binnie agreed that the right to 
counsel was triggered by an investigatory detention - 
”without delay” means immediately - he disagreed 
with the majority that there was no detention in this 
case. Justice Binnie believed that the accused was 
subject to an investigative detention at the outset of 
the encounter. “The police at this stage were not 
making  ‘general inquiries’, but were responding  to a 
‘specific occurrence’, in which a ‘particular 
individual’ trying  lamely to deflect attention, was 
actually attracting  attention to himself,” said Justice 
Binnie. “The verbal exchange between [the officer 
and the accused] clearly established an unambiguous 
police order.  ... It was clear to [the accused] that he 
was not free to go ‘anywhere’ and any reasonable 
person in that position would have come to the same 
conclusion.” 
The detention was unsupported by a reasonable 
suspicion and was therefore arbitrary. In Justice 
Binnie’s opinion, the self-incriminatory statements 
obtained prior to the s.10(b) rights being  read ought 
to be excluded under s.24(2).  Justice Binnie would 
have ordered a new trial. Justice Fish agreed with the 
majority’s test for detention, but agreed with Justice 
Binnie that “[n]o rational person in [the accused’s] 
position would have thought that he was free to walk 
away or that the police would have let him go, had 
he tried.” Justice Fish would have also excluded the 
accused’s statement and order a new trial.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION:
A “MANN”LY REMINDER
“[P]olice officers may detain an individual for 
investigative purposes if there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect in all the 
circumstances that the individual is 
connected to a particular crime and that such 
a detention is necessary. In addition, where 
a police officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that his or her safety or that of others 
is at risk, the officer may engage in a 
protective pat-down search of the detained 
individual.  Both the detention and the pat-
down search must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner.   ... [T]he investigative 
detention should be brief in duration and 
does not impose an obligation on the 
detained individual to answer questions 
posed by the police. The investigative 
detention and protective search power are to 
be distinguished from an arrest and the 
incidental power to search on arrest....” - R. v. 
Mann, 2004 SCC 52 per majority at para. 45.
Note-able Quote
“A good objective of leadership is to help those 
who are doing poorly to do well and to help 
those who are doing well to do even better. ” - 
Jim Rohn
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NO PRIVACY IN GARBAGE PUT 
OUT FOR COLLECTION
R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17
Suspecting  the accused was operating 
an ecstasy lab in his home, police 
investigators, on several occasions, 
took bags from within lidless garbage 
cans that had been placed just inside 
his property line—parallel to and contiguous to a 
back alleyway. The officers needed to reach through 
the airspace over the property line in order to retrieve 
the bags.  Police seized various items, including 
tornup chemical recipes and instructions, gloves, 
used duct tape, paper towel sheets, packaging  for 
rubber gloves, packaging  for a digital scale, a product 
card for a vacuum pump, a balloon, a receipt for 
muriatic acid and an empty clear plastic bag  with 
residue inside.  Some of the items bore a detectable 
odour of sassafras oil and some were found to be 
contaminated with ecstasy. Using  these items, along 
with other information, the police obtained a search 
warrant for the accused’s home and found 2,679 
MDA pills and other evidence. He was charged with 
unlawfully producing, possessing, and trafficking 
MDA.
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
argued the police inspection of his garbage was an 
unreasonable search under the Charter and they 
would not have been able to obtain the search 
warrant without the information they derived from it.  
Thus, the resultant search warrant was tainted and the 
search of his home was a s.8 Charter breach. And 
since the breach was serious, the accused submitted 
that admission of the evidence would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  The trial 
judge, however, found the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the items seized 
from his garbage, the search warrant was therefore 
valid, and the search of his home was lawful.   The 
evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of unlawfully producing, possessing  and 
trafficking ecstasy. 
 
The accused’s appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
was unsuccessful. A majority of the Court agreed with 
the trial judge that the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The items found 
did not reveal “intimate details of lifestyle or core 
biographical details to which privacy protection 
ought to be extended.” By placing  the items in the 
garbage to be picked up by garbage collectors, the 
accused relinquished control over the items and a 
reasonable person would not expect garbage to be 
secure and private. The accused’s conviction was 
upheld. 
Justice Conrad, on the other hand, opined that the 
contents of the garbage bags did disclose personal 
and biographical information about the accused’s 
lifestyle and personal choices which enabled the 
police to draw conclusions about what he was doing 
inside his house. As well, in her view, the trial judge 
failed to consider territorial privacy in the home and 
its perimeter (yard)—the garbage was inside the 
property line. The accused had not relinquished his 
privacy interest in the articles still on his property in 
opaque sealed bags which were subject to his power 
of retrieval at the time when they were collected by 
the police.  Finding  a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, Justice Conrad concluded the police 
breached s.8, would have excluded the evidence, set 
aside the search warrant, and dismissed the charges. 
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Six justices agreed that the accused had 
neither a reasonable expectation of territorial privacy 
with respect to where the garbage bags were stored 
thereon nor a reasonable expecta t ion o f 
informational privacy with respect to the garbage 
bags and the information stored therein. The accused 
dealt with the items in such a way that he forfeited 
any reasonable (objective) expectation of keeping  its 
contents confidential.  
Justice Binnie, writing  the judgment for the six 
member majority of the Supreme Court, cited several 
cases where looking  through garbage provided 
important evidence probative at trial, including:
• documents related to a murder found in garbage 
bags left out front of an apartment building  and 
commingled with other residents’ bags; 
• a burned baseball bat used to beat a person to 
death found in a dumpster located on a residential 
property;
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• cans, cups and straws tossed into garbage bins 
and onto the ground in the public domain from 
which DNA has been extracted; 
• a deceased’s gloves found in garbage behind a 
residential address;
• a body placed in a commercial dumpster and later 
located in a landfill site;
• a sweatshirt found in the garbage close to the 
scenes of a murder and sexual assaults that 
contained important DNA evidence;
• a tissue left in a garbage pail in a motel room that 
the accused had checked out of; and 
• boxes found in a garbage pail in a common 
laundry room adjacent to an accused’s suite that 
connected the accused to a robbery. 
Abandonment
 
A person who abandons an item ceases to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it: 
The concept of abandonment is 
about whether a presumed 
subjective privacy interest of 
the householder in trash put 
out for collection is one that an 
independent and informed 
observer, viewing the matter 
objectively, would consider 
reasonable in the totality of the 
circumstances having regard 
firstly to the need to balance 
“societal interests in protecting 
individual dignity, integrity and 
autonomy with effective law 
en fo rcemen t ” ;  second ly, 
whether an accused has 
conducted himself in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the 
reasonable continued assertion 
of a privacy interest and, 
t h i r d l y, t h e l o n g - t e r m 
consequences for the due 
protection of privacy interests 
in our society. [references 
omitted, para. 20]
However, whether abandonment 
occurs is a question of fact. Has 
the person claiming  s.8  Charter 
protection acted “in such a manner as to lead a 
reasonable and independent observer to conclude 
that his continued assertion of a privacy interest is 
unreasonable in the totality of the circumstances?” 
This totality of the circumstances analysis must be 
looked at regardless of whether the privacy claim 
involves personal, territorial, or informational privacy. 
“Residential waste includes an enormous amount of 
personal information about what is going  on in our 
homes, including  a lot of DNA on household tissues, 
highly personal records (e.g., love letters, overdue 
bills and tax returns) and hidden vices (pill bottles, 
syringes, sexual paraphernalia, etc.),” said Justice 
Binnie. “A garbage bag  may more accurately be 
described as a bag  of ‘information’ whose contents, 
viewed in their entirety, paint a fairly accurate and 
complete picture of the householder’s activities and 
lifestyle. Many of us may not wish to disclose these 
things to the public generally or to the police in 
particular.” 
Here, the accused had both an 
interest in the garbage itself as well 
as its informational content. And 
Justice Binnie noted that the issue 
wa s n o t wh e t h e r h e h a d a 
“legitimate privacy interest in the 
concealment of drug  paraphernalia, 
but whether people generally have a 
privacy interest in the concealed 
contents of an opaque and sealed 
‘bag  of information’”,  which he did 
believe they had. 
However, any subjective expectation 
of privacy the accused may have had 
was not objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances. This was not a case of 
the police grabbing  sealed bags as 
they were unloaded from the 
accused’s vehicle in the back alley to 
temporarily place them on public 
property, not yet making  their way to 
the sanctuary of a residential lot. Nor 
was it a perimeter search. “The long 
arm of the law” merely reached 
across the property line to collect the 
bags of garbage. “I … do not think 
constitutional protection should turn 
“Residential waste includes an 
enormous amount of personal 
information about what is 
going on in our homes, 
including a lot of DNA on 
household tissues, highly 
personal records (e.g., love 
letters, overdue bills and tax 
returns) and hidden vices (pill 
bottles, syringes, sexual 
paraphernalia, etc.). A 
garbage bag may more 
accurately be described as a 
bag of ‘information’ whose 
contents, viewed in their 
entirety, paint a fairly 
accurate and complete picture 
of the householder’s activities 
and lifestyle..” 
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on whether the bags were placed a few inches inside 
the property line or a few inches outside it,” said 
Justice Binnie. “The point is that the garbage was at 
the property line, accessible to passers-by. The 
territorial privacy implicated by the physical intrusion 
of the police was relatively peripheral and merely 
considered as part of the totality of circumstances in 
the informational privacy claim.  
 
The accused intended to abandon his proprietary 
interest in the physical objects themselves and did 
not have a reasonable continuing  privacy interest in 
the information which the contents revealed to the 
police:
[M]uch garbage never becomes anonymous, e.g. 
addressed envelopes, personal letters and so on.  
In this case, the garbage included invoices for the 
purchase of chemicals used in the preparation of 
the drug Ecstasy.   The idea that s. 8  protects an 
individuals’s privacy in garbage until the last 
unpaid bill rots into dust, or the incriminating 
letters turn into muck and are no longer 
decipherable, is to my mind too extravagant to 
contemplate.  It would require the entire 
municipal disposal system to be regarded as an 
extension, in terms of privacy, of the dwelling-
house.  Yet if there is to be a reasonable cut-off 
point, where is it to be located?  The line must be 
eas i ly in te l l ig ib le to bo th po l ice and 
homeowners.  Logically, because abandonment is 
a conclusion inferred from the conduct of the 
individual claiming the s. 8  right, the 
reasonableness line must relate to the conduct of 
that individual and not to anything done or not 
done by the garbage collectors, the police or 
anyone else involved in the subsequent collection 
and treatment of the “bag of information”.
 
…   Here, I believe, abandonment occurred when 
the [accused] placed his garbage bags for 
collection in the open container at the back of his 
property adjacent to the lot line.   He had done 
everything required of him to commit his rubbish 
to the municipal collection system.  The bags 
were unprotected and within easy reach of 
anyone walking  by in a public alleyway, 
including  street people, bottle pickers, urban 
foragers, nosey neighbours and mischievous 
children, not to mention dogs and assorted 
wildlife, as well as the garbage collectors and the 
police.  This conclusion is in general accord with 
the jurisprudence. [paras. 54-55]
 
And further:
 
Nevertheless, until the garbage is placed at or 
within reach of the lot line, the householder 
retains an element of control over its disposition 
and cannot be said to have unequivocally 
abandoned it, particularly if it is placed on a 
porch or in a garage or within the immediate 
vicinity of the dwelling  where the principles set 
out in the “perimeter” cases … .
 
In municipalities (if there are any left) where 
garbage collectors come to the garage or porch 
and carry the garbage to the street, they are 
operating under (at least) an implied licence from 
the householder to come onto the property.   The 
licence does not extend to the police.   However, 
when the garbage is placed at the lot line for 
collection, I believe the householder has 
sufficiently abandoned his interest and control to 
eliminate any objectively reasonable privacy 
interest.
 
Given the “totality of the circumstances” test, 
little would be gained by an essay on different 
variations of garbage disposal.  To take a few 
common examples, however, the rural people 
who take their garbage to a dump and abandon it 
to the pickers and the seagulls, the apartment 
dweller who unloads garbage down a chute to 
the potential scrutiny of a curious building 
superintendent, and the householder who takes 
surreptitious advantage of a conveniently located 
“[T]he rural people who take their garbage to a dump and abandon it to the pickers and the 
seagulls, the apartment dweller who unloads garbage down a chute to the potential scrutiny 
of a curious building superintendent, and the householder who takes surreptitious advantage 
of a conveniently located dumpster to rid himself or herself of the “bag of information” are all 
acting in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable assertion of a continuing privacy interest.” 
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dumpster to rid himself or 
herself of the “bag of 
information” are all acting 
in a manner inconsistent 
w i t h t h e r e a s o n a b l e 
assertion of a continuing 
privacy interest, in my 
view. [references omitted, 
paras. 62-64]
 
The Court also rejected the 
contention that the accused 
retained an objectively 
reasonable privacy interest in 
the contents of the garbage 
bags until the bags were 
actually collected by the 
municipal employees.  And 
the Court did not accept the 
proposition that private 
information should remain 
confidential to the persons it 
was intended to be divulged 
(i.e. the garbage collectors), 
and for the purpose for 
which it was divulged. “[T]o 
extend it to the garbage 
c o l l e c t o r / h o u s e h o l d e r 
relationship, such as it is, is a step too far,” said 
Justice Binnie. “Not only does the garbage collector 
not undertake to keep the trash confidential, any 
expectation by a householder of any such 
undertaking  would be plainly unreasonable.” Nor did 
the city bylaw that prohibited scavenging  from 
garbage cans protect his privacy interest: 
 
... The fact that a City of Calgary bylaw says that 
only garbage collectors may collect garbage has 
little bearing, in my view, on the proper 
characterization of the [accused’s] conduct in 
discarding to the municipal garbage system 
articles that proved to be of interest to the police.  
His conduct was plainly inconsistent with the 
retention of a privacy interest as, in my view, an 
independent observer would not regard such an 
expectation of privacy as reasonable in the 
totality of the circumstances. [para. 68]
 
Finally, the accused’s “conduct was ... inconsistent 
with preservation of [privacy] and tipped the balance 
in favour of the [legitimate demands of law 
enforcement and cr iminal 
investigation].” The police 
techniques in this case did not 
undermine privacy nor have the 
potential to make social life in 
Canada intolerable. Because the 
bags were abandoned, there was 
no subsisting  privacy interest at 
the time the police gathered the 
bags, even though lifestyle and 
biographical information was 
exposed, and therefore there was 
no violation of his Charter rights:
In summary ... the [accused] 
had abandoned his privacy 
interest in the contents of the 
garbage bags gathered up by 
the police when he placed 
them in the garbage alcove 
open to the laneway ready for 
collection.  The taking  by the 
police did not constitute a 
search and seizure within the 
scope of s. 8, and the evidence 
(as well as the fruits of the 
search warrant obtained in 
reliance on such evidence) was 
properly admissible. [para. 73]
 
Since there was no Charter breach there was no need 
to consider the admission or exclusion of the 
evidence under s.24(2).
  
A Single Dissent
Justice Abella found that the accused did have a 
privacy interest in the personal information 
emanating  from his home in the form of household 
waste and put out for disposal. He was entitled to 
protection from indiscriminate state intrusion. In her 
view, there should be at least a reasonable suspicion 
that a crime has been or is likely to be committed 
before the police could rummage through his 
personal information:
Individuals who put out their household waste as 
“garbage” expect that it will reach the waste 
disposal system: nothing more, nothing less.  No 
one would reasonably expect the personal 
information contained in their household waste 
“[The accused’s] initial privacy 
interest in the evidence was 
abandoned when he placed the bags 
for collection as garbage from a 
stand indented in the back fence of 
his Calgary home adjacent to a 
public alleyway, to which any passing 
member of the public had ready 
access. The police had no greater 
access in this regard than the public, 
but their access was no less.  At that 
point, the [accused] had done 
everything required to rid himself of 
the contents including whatever 
private information was embedded 
therein, and this conduct ... , was 
inconsistent with the continued 
assertion of a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest.” 
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to be publicly available for random scrutiny by 
anyone, let alone the state, before it reaches its 
intended destination.  Household waste, it is true, 
is composed of abandoned items that the 
occupant of the household may no longer wish to 
keep in his or her home.  In my view, however, it 
is a further and unwarranted step to conclude that 
these indiv iduals have abandoned the 
expectation, reasonable in my view, that the 
personal information emanating from their home 
will remain private.
 
While personal information may be obtained by 
searching  through household waste that is left at 
or in close proximity to the property line for 
collection, on the other hand the individual 
disposing  of the waste has indicated an intention 
to part with the objects contained in it.   From a 
balancing of the Tessling factors, this leads to a 
conclusion that we are dealing  with a diminished 
expectation of privacy, not unlike the reduced 
expectation at border crossings ... This does not 
mean that the state can arbitrarily search through 
the information. Barring  exigent circumstances, 
there should at least be a threshold of reasonable 
suspicion about the possibility of a criminal 
offence before household waste left for collection 
is searched. ... [paras. 89-90]
 
In this case, however, Justice Abella concluded the 
police had ample evidence to support a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused had committed a crime 
and were therefore entitled to search the household 
waste left for disposal. Since there was no Charter 
breach she too would dismiss the appeal. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
CDSA FORFEITURE 
PROCEEDINGS ARE 
INDEPENDENT OF SENTENCING
R. v. Craig, 2009 SCC 23
R. v. Ouellette, 2009 SCC 24
R. v. Nguyen, 2009 SCC 25
In a trilogy of cases involving  the 
offence-related real property forfeiture 
provisions under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act the Supreme 
Court of Canada has outlined the 
following principles:
• Forfeiture orders should be approached 
independently from the broader sentencing 
inquiry and a forfeiture order should not be taken 
into consideration in crafting  a fi t and 
proportionate sentence:
There is no doubt that forfeiture may be 
punitive in its impact.  ... It does not follow, 
however, that it should be consolidated with 
sentencing on a totality approach, especially 
since it almost inevitably leads to lower terms 
of imprisonment for offenders with property if 
one treats the “total” punishment (jail plus 
forfeiture) as   unduly harsh. In other words, 
people with property might be able to avoid 
jail or receive reduced custodial terms, while 
those without property would not.
Such a result troubles not only the conscience 
by inadvertently rewarding offenders with 
property available for forfeiture and penalizing 
those without, it offends our bedrock notions 
of fitness in sentencing since individuals with 
no proper ty to for fe i t a re no more 
blameworthy than those with property.   It 
would be unjust for them to receive more 
severe custodial terms simply because they 
have no property to forfeit. [majority at paras. 
34-35]
And:
In addition to my concern that those without 
property should not be treated more harshly 
than those who have it, I see the purpose and 
statutory language underlying the forfeiture 
scheme as a reflection of Parliament’s 
intention that forfeiture orders be treated 
independently, pursuant to a separate 
rationale and as a distinct response to distinct 
circumstances.   The sentencing inquiry 
focuses on the individualized circumstances 
of the offender; the main focus of forfeiture 
orders, on the other hand, is on the property 
itself and its role in past and future crime. 
[majority at para. 40]
• forfeiture of property is not an all-or-nothing  affair 
and partial forfeiture is available under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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C.O.N. OFFENCE-RELATED REAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE GRID
Case Property 
Description
Offences Crime Description Trial Disposition Appeal Results
Craig ✓ older two level 
home
✓ 1,000 sq. ft.
✓ accused lived 
in house
✓ producing 
marihuana
✓ 186 marihuana plants 
including clones, packaging, 
scales, a container with one 
pound of marihuana 
packaged for wholesale 
distribution, additional pre-
packed marihuana, & score 
sheets
✓ basement & portions of main 
floor devoted to cultivation
✓ three growing rooms & one 
drying room
✓ industrial lighting, ventilation, 
& irrigation systems
✓ 12 month conditional 
sentence
✓ $100,000 fine
✓ ordered to pay a $15,000 
victim surcharge
✓ no forfeiture of house
BCCA upheld 
conditional 
sentence but set 
aside the fine & 
victim surcharge, 
instead ordering 
forfeiture of the 
house.
SCC allowed the 
appeal and set 
aside the forfeiture 
order.
Mitigation
✓ no criminal record
Aggravation
✓ operation was sizable
✓ operation had been 
ongoing for a number of 
years
Ouellette ✓ two level home
✓ accused lived 
in house
✓ producing 
marihuana
✓ possession 
for the 
purpose of 
trafficking
✓ 129 marihuana plants, scales, 
& 14 kgs. of marihuana leaves 
in freezer
✓ grow occupied basement
✓ specialized lighting & 
ventilation was installed
✓ a gun was found upstairs
✓ building was protected by a 
makeshift surveillance system
✓ very little of the residence was 
used for anything but the grow 
operation
✓ 10 month conditional 
sentence
✓ one year probation
✓ ordered to pay a $2,000 
donation
✓ plus full forfeiture of the 
house
QueCA allowed the 
appeal & only 
ordered partial 
(half) forfeiture of 
the house.
SCC upheld the 
forfeiture order & 
dismissed the 
appeal.
Mitigation
✓ no related criminal record, 
only an impaired driving 
conviction  
✓ no link to organized crime
✓ had been working for nine 
years
Aggravation
✓ property adapted primarily 
for marihuana production
✓ profit motive
✓ possession of a gun
Nguyen ✓ three level 
home
✓ accused were 
married couple 
living 
elsewhere
✓ 18 year old 
daughter  lived 
at the house
✓ producing 
marihuana
✓ possession 
for the 
purpose of 
trafficking
✓ 96 marihuana plants
✓ recent harvest & a new crop 
had been prepared
✓ marihuana clones found in the 
kitchen refrigerator
✓ two of three upstairs 
bedrooms used on a 
transitory basis
✓ front exterior door had a metal 
bracket and a barricade
✓ windows to basement rooms 
containing plants was 
boarded up
✓ lighting, irrigation, & 
ventilation systems had been 
installed
✓ air fresheners installed on 
main floor
✓ 18 month conditional 
sentence
✓ plus full forfeiture of the 
residence
BCCA upheld the 
forfeiture order.
SCC upheld the 
forfeiture order.
Mitigation
✓ neither accused had a 
criminal record
✓ no involvement in 
organized crime
Aggravation
✓ sophistication and 
commercial nature of the 
operation
✓ likely house had been 
purchased solely for 
growing marihuana
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POLICE DUTY TO DISCLOSE CAN 
INCLUDE DISCIPLINARY FILES
R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3
The accused was arrested by police for 
an alleged drug  transaction.  He was 
sub sequen t l y p ro secu t ed and 
convicted on multiple drug  charges, 
including  possession of marijuana and 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.  The arresting 
officer was the Crown’s main witness and testified to 
the reasonable grounds supporting  the accused’s 
arrest. Furthermore, the finding  that the possession of 
marijuana and cocaine was for the purpose of 
trafficking turned on the arresting officer’s credibility.
Following  his conviction but before sentencing, the 
accused learned that the arresting  officer was 
engaged in drug‑related misconduct that had led to 
both internal disciplinary proceedings under the 
provincial Police Services Act and to criminal 
charges. Both were ongoing  at the time. The accused 
chose to proceed to sentence and appeal his 
conviction instead. Although the Ontario Court of 
Appeal found some of the targeted records met the 
relevancy threshold required for third party 
production, it ruled there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the criminal investigation 
files related to the charges against the arresting  officer 
and ordered the files disclosed, subject to irrelevancy 
and privilege. As for the police disciplinary records, 
the court adjourned the motion.
The Ontario Attorney General was granted leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and the 
production order was stayed pending  disposition of 
the appeal.  The arresting  officer subsequently pled 
guilty to one of the criminal charges brought against 
him and the accused’s convictions were set aside by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Crown did not re-
prosecute the accused and he withdrew his 
participation in the appeal, but the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case anyways. 
In an unanimous judgment the Supreme Court 
allowed the appeal and set aside the Ontario high 
court order. The Court also explained the respective 
obligations of the Crown and the police to disclose 
the fruits of an investigation to an accused.
First Party Disclosure Regime (Stinchcombe) 
Under disclosure law, the Crown must disclose all 
relevant evidence in their possession to an accused 
person. “The Crown’s obligation 
t o d i s c lo se a l l r e l evan t 
information in its possession to 
an accused is well established 
at common law and is now 
constitutionally entrenched in the right to full answer 
and defence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter,” said 
the Court. The Supreme Court described the Crown’s 
duty to disclose as follows:
The Crown’s obligation to disclose all relevant 
information in its possession relating to the 
investigation against an  accused is well 
established.  The duty is triggered upon request 
and does not require an application to the 
court. ... [R]elevant information in the first party 
production context includes not only information 
related to those matters the Crown intends to 
adduce in evidence against the accused, but also 
any information in respect of which there is a  
reasonable possibility that it may assist the 
accused in the exercise of the right to make full 
answer and defence ... .  The Crown’s obligation 
survives the trial and, in the appellate context, the 
scope of relevant information therefore includes 
any information in respect of which there is a 
reasonable possibility that it may assist the 
appellant in prosecuting an appeal.
While the Stinchcombe automatic disclosure 
obligation is not absolute, it admits of few 
exceptions. Unless the information is clearly 
irrelevant, privileged, or its disclosure is 
otherwise governed by law, the Crown must 
disclose to the accused all material in its 
possession. The Crown retains discretion as to the 
manner and timing  of disclosure where the 
circumstances are such that disclosure in the 
usual course may result in harm to anyone or 
prejudice to the public interest.  The Crown’s 
exercise of discretion in  fulfilling  its obligation to 
disclose is reviewable by a court.
... [T]he Crown’s obligation under Stinchcombe 
to disclose the fruits of the investigation does not 
signify that no residual privacy interest can exist 
in the contents of the Crown’s file. It should come 
as no surprise that any number of persons and 
Onus on the 
Crown to justify 
non-disclosure.
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entities may have a residual 
privacy interest in material 
gathered in the course of a 
criminal investigation. Criminal 
investigative files may contain 
highly sens i t ive mater ia l 
including: outlines of unproven 
allegations; statements of 
complainants or witnesses — at times concerning 
very personal matters; personal addresses and 
phone numbers; photographs; medical reports; 
bank statements; search warrant information; 
surveillance reports; communications intercepted 
by wiretap; scientific evidence including  DNA 
information; criminal records, etc.  The privacy 
legislation of all 10 provinces addresses the 
disclosure of information contained in law 
enforcement files. ... [paras. 17-19]
The prosecuting  Crown must disclose material in its 
possession that is relevant to the accused’s case and 
the the onus is on the Crown to justify the non-
disclosure of any material in its possession. This first 
party regime of disclosure extends only to material in 
the possession or control of the Crown:
... The law cannot impose an obligation on the 
Crown to disclose material which it does not 
have or cannot obtain. A question then arises as 
to whether “the Crown”, for disclosure purposes, 
encompasses other state authorities.  The notion 
that all state authorities amount to a single 
“Crown” entity for the purposes of disclosure and 
production must be quickly rejected.  It finds no 
support in law and, given our multi‑tiered system 
of governance and the realities of Canada’s  
geography, is unworkable in practice. ... 
Accordingly, the Stinchcombe disclosure regime 
only extends to material relating  to the accused’s 
case in the possession or control of the 
prosecuting  Crown entity.  This  material is 
commonly referred to as the “fruits of the 
investigation”. [references omitted, para. 22]
As part of the Crown’s duty to disclose, it also has a 
duty to make some inquiries. Although it does not 
have to inquire whether every department of the 
provincial or federal government or every police 
force are in possession of material relevant to the 
accused’s case, there is an obligation to make 
reasonable inquiries of other Crown entities and 
other third parties, in appropriate cases, with respect 
to records and information in their 
possession that may be relevant to 
the case being  prosecuted. The 
Crown is not always a passive 
recipient of relevant information 
with no obligation of its own to 
seek out and obtain relevant 
material: 
The Crown is not an ordinary litigant.  As a 
minister of justice, the Crown’s undivided loyalty 
is to the proper administration of justice. As such, 
Crown counsel who is put on notice of the 
existence of relevant information cannot simply 
disregard the matter.  Unless the notice appears 
unfounded, Crown counsel will not be able to 
fully assess the merits of the case and fulfill its 
duty as an officer of the court without inquiring 
further and obtaining the information if it is 
reasonably feasible to do so.  ...
The same duty to inquire applies when the Crown 
is informed of potentially relevant evidence 
pertaining to the credibility or reliability of the 
witnesses in a   case.   ... “[T]he Crown and the 
defence are not adverse in interest in discovering 
the existence of an unreliable or unethical police 
officer” ... [references omitted, paras. 49-50]
In fulfilling  its dual role as an officer of the court and 
an advocate, the Crown can bridge much of the gap 
between first and third party disclosure.
Third Party Disclosure Regime (O’Connor) 
    
The common law provides the 
accused with a mechanism for 
accessing  third party records 
that fall beyond the reach of the 
first party disclosure regime. 
The test for production of third 
party records involves a two part test:
1. Likely Relevance Test: The applicant (person 
seeking  production) must demonstrate that the 
information contained in the targeted third party 
record is likely relevant.
• burden is on person seeking  production to 
show likely relevance;
• no assumption that information is relevant;
“The law cannot impose an 
obligation on the Crown to 
disclose material which it does 
not have or cannot obtain.” 
Onus on the 
accused to show 
documents are 
likely relevant. 
Volume 9 Issue 4 - July/August 2009
PAGE 50
• likely relevance threshold screens fishing 
expeditions; 
• likely relevance threshold is significant burden 
but not onerous;
• likely relevance means there is a reasonable 
possibility that the information is likely 
probative to an issue at trial or the competence 
of a witness to testify. “An ‘issue at trial’ here 
includes not only material issues concerning 
the unfolding  of the events which form the 
subject matter of the proceedings, but also 
‘evidence relating  to the credibility of 
witnesses and to the reliability of other 
evidence in the case’.” 
2. Balancing Test: If the threshold of likely 
relevance is met, a judge may then order 
production of the targeted records for inspection 
by the court to determine whether production 
should be ordered to an accused. After viewing 
the records, the court will determine whether, and 
to what extent, production should be ordered by 
weighing  the positive and negative consequences 
of production - balancing  the competing  interests 
of the third party’s privacy interest with the 
accused’s interest in making  full answer and 
defence. 
If the claim of likely relevance, upon inspection of 
the documents, is not borne out and the 
documents are clearly irrelevant to the trial of the 
accused then there is no basis for compelling 
production to the accused and the application can 
be summarily dismissed. If the claim of likely 
relevance, upon inspection of the documents, is 
borne out, the accused’s right to make full answer 
and defence will, subject to a few exceptions, tip 
the balance in favour of allowing  the application 
for production. 
The third party common law 
production regime is not limited 
to cases where a  third party has 
an expectation of privacy in the 
targeted documents, but provides 
a general mechanism at common 
law for ordering  production of 
any record beyond the possession 
or control of the prosecuting 
Crown.  Whether or not the targeted record is 
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
one of the questions that must be determined at 
the hearing. There can be an expectation of 
privacy in the contents of a criminal investigation 
file relating  to third party accused or police 
disciplinary records that are not in the possession 
or control of the prosecuting  Crown.  “There can 
be no assumption that criminal investigation files 
relating  to third party accused persons do not 
attract an expectation of privacy absent 
consideration of their particular contents and 
other relevant factors,” said the Court. “The 
existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and its impact, if any, on a third party’s obligation 
to produce is always a contextual, fact-based 
inquiry.   Likewise, no blanket ruling  can be made 
in respect of privacy interests in police disciplinary 
records without regard to their contents.”
As well, records in possession of one Crown entity 
are not in the possession of another. “The notion 
that all state authorities constitute a single 
indivisible Crown entity for the purposes of 
disclosure finds no support in law and, moreover, 
is unworkable in practice,” said the Court 
“Accordingly, Crown entities other than the 
prosecuting  Crown are third parties under the ... 
production regime.” 
Police and Disclosure 
The police play a very key 
role in disclosure. The 
police have a corollary 
duty to disclose to the prosecuting  Crown all material 
pertaining  to the investigation of an accused.  “The 
necessary corollary to the Crown’s disclosure duty 
under Stinchcombe is the obligation of police (or 
other investigating  state authority) to disclose to the 
Crown all material pertaining 
to its  investigation of the 
accused,” said the Court. “For 
the purposes of  fulfilling  this 
corollary obligation, the 
investigating  police force, 
a l t h o u g h d i s t i n c t a n d 
independent from the Crown 
at law, is not a third party.  
“The necessary corollary to the 
Crown’s disclosure duty ... is the 
obligation of police ... to 
disclose to the Crown all 
material pertaining to 
its investigation of the accused.”  
The police are not 
a third party despite 
being distinct & 
independent from 
Crown.
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Rather, it acts on the same first party footing 
as the Crown.” The Court continued:
Under our Canadian system of law 
enforcement, the general duty to investigate 
crime falls on the police, not the Crown. The 
fruits of the investigation against an accused 
person, therefore, will generally have been 
gathered, and any resulting criminal charge 
laid, by the police.  While the roles of the 
Crown and the police are separate and 
distinct, the police have a duty to participate 
in prosecutions ... . Of particular relevance 
here is the police’s duty to participate in the 
disclosure process. The means by which the 
Crown comes to be in possession of the 
fruits of the investigation lies in the corollary 
duty of police investigators to disclose to the 
C r ow n a l l r e l e va n t m a t e r i a l i n t h e i r 
possession. The police’s obligation to disclose all 
material pertaining to the investigation of an 
accused to the prosecuting  Crown was 
recognized long before Stinchcombe.  ...
The  corollary duty of the police to disclose to the 
Crown the fruits of the investigation is now well 
recognized in the appellate jurisprudence.  ... It is 
also widely acknowledged that the Crown cannot 
explain a failure to disclose relevant material on 
the basis that the investigating  police force failed 
to disclose it to the Crown.  ...
Even though, in this narrow sense, the police and 
the Crown may be viewed as one entity for 
disclosure purposes, the two are unquestionably 
separate and independent entities, both in fact 
and in law.  Hence, production of criminal 
investigation files involving third parties, and that 
of police disciplinary records, usually falls to be 
determined in the context of an O’Connor 
application.  This is unsurprising because 
information about third party accused or police 
misconduct is not likely to make its way into the 
Crown’s Stinchcombe disclosure package unless 
such information is in some way related to the 
accused’s case.... [references omitted, paras. 
23-25]  
Disclosing Police Misconduct Information
Although an “accused has no right to automatic 
disclosure of every aspect of a police officer’s 
employment history or to police disciplinary matters 
with no realistic bearing 
on the case against him 
or her,” information of 
misconduct by a police 
officer involved in a 
case against an accused 
should form part of the 
first party disclosure 
package provided to 
Crown if it is relevant: 
... [R]ecords relating 
to findings of serious 
misconduct by police 
officers involved in 
t h e i nve s t i g a t i o n 
against the accused 
properly fall within 
the scope of the “first party” disclosure package 
due to the Crown, where the police misconduct 
is either related to the investigation, or the finding 
of misconduct could reasonably impact on the 
case against the accused.  The Crown, in turn, 
must provide disclosure to the accused in 
accordance wi th i t s obl igat ions under 
Stinchcombe. Production of disciplinary records 
and criminal investigation files in the possession 
of the police that do not fall within the scope of 
this first party disclosure package is governed by 
the...regime for third party production. [para. 15]
And:
When the police misconduct in question 
concerns the same incident that forms the 
subject-matter of the charge against the accused, 
the police duty to disclose information 
concerning police disciplinary action taken in 
respect of that misconduct is rather self-
evident. To state an obvious example, if a police 
officer is charged under the applicable provincial 
legislation for excessive use of force in relation to 
the accused’s arrest, this information must be 
disclosed to the Crown. Where the misconduct of 
a police witness is not directly related to the 
investigation against the accused, it may 
nonetheless be relevant to the accused’s case, in 
which case it should also be disclosed.  For 
example, no one would question that the 
criminal record for perjury of a civilian material 
witness would be of relevance to the accused and 
should form part of the first party disclosure 
“The  corollary duty of the 
police to disclose to the 
Crown the fruits of the 
investigation is now well 
recognized ... .  It is also widely 
acknowledged that the Crown 
cannot explain a failure to 
disclose relevant material on 
the basis that the investigating 
police force failed to disclose 
it to the Crown.”  
Volume 9 Issue 4 - July/August 2009
PAGE 52
package.  In the same way, findings of police 
misconduct by a police officer involved in the 
case against the accused that may have a bearing 
on the case against an accused should be 
disclosed. [para. 54]
And further:
[I]t is “neither efficient nor justified” to leave the 
entire question of access to police misconduct 
records to be determined in the context of the ... 
regime for third party production.   Indeed ... the 
disclosure of relevant material, whether it be for 
or against an accused, is part of the police 
corollary duty to participate in the disclosure 
process.  Where the information is obviously 
relevant to the accused’s case, it should form part 
of the first party disclosure package to the Crown 
without prompting.  For example, ... if an officer 
comes under investigation for serious drug-
related misconduct, it becomes incumbent upon 
the police force, in fulfilment of its corollary duty 
of disclosure to the Crown, to look into those 
criminal cases in which the officer is involved 
and to take appropriate action.   Of course, not 
every finding of police misconduct by an officer 
involved in the investigation will be of relevance 
to an accused’s case. The officer may have played 
a peripheral role in the investigation, or the 
misconduct in question may have no realistic 
bearing on the credibility or reliability of the 
officer’s evidence. ...
With respect to records concerning  police 
disciplinary matters that do not fall within the 
scope of first party disclosure obligations, 
procedures ... tailored to suit the particular needs 
o f t he communi t y in wh ich they a re 
implemented, can go a long  way towards 
ensuring  a more efficient streamlining of ... 
applications for third party production.  Trial 
courts seized with motions for disclosure under 
Stinchcombe or applications for third party 
production are well placed to make appropriate 
orders to foster the necessary cooperation 
between police, the Crown and defence counsel. 
[references omitted, paras. 59-60]
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
2009 Abbotsford Police Challenge Run
Saturday September 19, 2009
The Abbotsford Police Challenge Run started in 
1990 to raise funds for BC Special Olympics. Since 
its inception, the number of participants and 
sponsors has increased to the point where the 
Abbotsford Police Challenge has become the 
premier event of its kind in the Fraser Valley. The 
Abbotsford Police Challenge is committed to being 
a family oriented event and for those who don’t run 
there is a 5 kilometer fun run/walk route so no one 
is excluded from participating. It is now one of the 
leading community fundraisers for the BC Special 
Olympics, ALS Society and The United Way.   
 
EVENTS
10K Challenge and 5K Fun Run 
Walkers, runners, wheelchairs and strollers welcome! 
LOCATION 
Civic Plaza, next to the Abbotsford Police 
Department 2838 Justice Way, Abbotsford, BC  
  
RACE TIME 
Both events start at 9am 
Warm-up led by Apollo Athletic Club at 8:30am at 
Civic Plaza 
 
INFORMATION 
Abbotsford Police Department 
Phone: 604-859-5225 or 1-800-898-6111 
Ask for the Challenge Run local or visit our website 
at:  
www.abbypd.ca www.10-8.ca
